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I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment seeks to examine the procedural issue presented by a conflict
between the federal circuit courts. At issue in the split between on the one hand,
the D.C. and Eighth Circuits, and on the other, the Eleventh Circuit, is the effect on
existing federal common law when Congress enacts a statute covering the same
substantive area of law. The question of the interaction between statutory and
common law is a difficult one because all judicial power is, by necessity, limited.
As Benjamin Cardozo described the judicial power:
courts... are free in marking the limits of the individual's immunities to shape
their judgments in accordance with reason and justice. That does not mean
that... they are free to substitute their own ideas of reason and justice for those
of the men and women whom they serve. Their standard must be an objective
one.1
Federal courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, are particularly restricted in
the exercise of their judicial power. Within their federal question jurisdiction,
however, they, like all courts, have the power to create common law. This power
might best be described as the ability to create a rule of decision to resolve a dis-
pute before the court when that dispute is not resolved by statute or administrative
rule. Though federal courts have the ability to create common law, this power is
only exercised in rare cases.2 These cases are made even rarer by the deference
that courts must show to the legislative branch; outside of constitutional law, the
judiciary regularly defers to the legislative branch's disposition of federal law.
This deference is at its height when Congress enacts comprehensive legislation. 3
The question of deference becomes more complicated, however, when Congress
legislates in an area where the courts have already created federal common law
rules of decision.
By comparing the specific conflict between, on the one hand, the D.C. Circuit's
decision in Murphy v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.4 and the Eighth Circuit's
decision in DiVall Insured Income Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Boatmen's First Na-
tional Bank,5 and, on the other, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Motorcity of
Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank,6 the issue of the deference of the judiciary to
the legislature comes into focus. The three cases examine the common law D'Oench
1. BnmuA N.CARrozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 88-89 (1921).
2. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) (describing the instances when a
federal court may create common law as "few and restricted").
3. See O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1994).
4. 61 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir 1995).
5. 69 F.3d 1398 (8th Cir. 1995).
6. 83 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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rule of decision. This rule was created by the United States Supreme Court in
1942 to protect the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from secret
agreements when it must step in to resolve a failing depository institution. Under
the D'Oench rule, secret agreements between a maker of an instrument and a de-
pository institution can not be asserted against the FDIC.8 In 1950, Congress codi-
fied a part of the common law rule.9 This codification was amended in 1989 by
the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA).10 Both Murphy and DiVall held that the latter amendment displaced
the D'Oench rule of decision. 11 As a result, any secret agreement that fell outside
the statute could be asserted against the FDIC, even if it would have been barred
by the common law rule. Motorcity rejected this result, arguing that there was no
indication within the statute that Congress intended it. 2
A comparison of these cases reveals for consideration the issue of the proper
standard to be applied to determine whether a statute has displaced the common
law. The Murphy/DiVall decisions relied upon the standard set forth in 0 'Melveny
& Myers v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,13 which held that FIRREA was a
comprehensive statute that barred the federal courts from creating new common
law.14 In relying upon a decision explaining a refusal to create new common law
to invalidate the well developed D'Oench rule, Murphy essentially created a new
standard for determining congressional displacement of established common law.
The Motorcity court refused to go along with the new standard and distinguished
O'Melveny & Myers as inapplicable; D'Oench was not new common law, but an
established rule of decision. 15 The Eleventh Circuit held that the standard used to
determine displacement should instead be that of United States v Texas, 16 which
required a finding of congressional intent to displace before abrogating established
common law.17 The Motorcity court was unable to find the requisite congres-
sional intent and found no displacement of D'Oench and its progeny. 18
Although this conflict centers around a narrow area of commercial law, the
decisions have ramifications beyond the substantive issue of which secret agree-
ments may be asserted against the FDIC. These cases add uncertainty to the inter-
play between statutory and common law. This Comment examines this area of
7. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447,457 (1942).
8. See id. at 460.
9. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) (1994).
10. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183.
11. See Murphy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 61 F.3d at 39; DiVall Insured Income Fund
Ltd. Partnership v. Boatmen's First Nat'l Bank, 69 F.3d at 1404. Although, strictly speaking,
DiVall concerned the federal holder in due course doctrine, that doctrine has its genesis in
D'Oench. See infra note 112. DiVall relied upon Murphy in reaching its decision that FIRREA
also displaced the federal holder in due course doctrine. See DiVall Insured Income Fund Ltd.
Partnership v. Boatmen's First Nat'l Bank, 69 F.3d at 1402.
12. See Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d at 1333.
13. 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
14. See id at 86-87.
15. See Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d at 1331.
16. 507 U.S. 529 (1993).
17. See Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d at 1333; United States v.
Texas, 507 U.S. at 539.
18. See Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d at 1333.
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interaction and argues that the Murphy/DiVall decisions were based upon a
misperception of the correct relationship between statute and common law and
were therefore wrongly decided. Part I introduces the federal common law and the
traditional approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in resolving the
common law with federal statutes. Part H provides context to the Circuit Court
split with an explanation of the substantive D'Oench common law ruleof decision
and its statutory enactments. Part Ill discusses the split between the circuits, while
Part IV suggests a resolution.
This Comment argues that the same policies underlying the reluctance of fed-
eral courts to create new common law also underlie the analysis of whether a stat-
ute has displaced the established common law even though the common law has a
much greater vitality in the latter case than in the former. When Congress has
created a comprehensive statutory scheme, the creation of new common law has
the potential to upset that scheme. 19 When Congress legislates against the back-
ground of established common law, on the other hand, it should be presumed that
there was no intent to displace that law. Absent an explicit contrary congressional
intent, the established common law should be seen as a complement to the con-
gressional scheme. Otherwise, Congress might rely upon a background of estab-
lished rules of decision when it creates its legislative scheme, only to find the plan
upset when a federal court uses the legislation to eliminate those established rules.
The question of the interaction between statutory and common law will arise
again in the future. Other circuits should follow the Eleventh Circuit's example in
Motorcity when faced with the question of the continued vitality of D'Oench and
should reject any attempt to expand the Murphy/DiVall presumption about federal
common law into other substantive areas. When courts retain the traditional pre-
sumption of the survival of common law, they ensure that an important part of our
system remains vital. The common law is an inherently flexible approach to rule-
making that exists in balance with legislative authority,20 Murphy/DiVall upset
this balance; for these reasons, the conflict between the circuits should be resolved
to continue the practice of refusing to find displacement of established common
law by a newly enacted statute unless there is explicit indication of a contrary
congressional intent.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They can exercise that juris-
diction in only two areas: where there is a complete diversity of citizenship in the
parties2' or where the action "aris[es] under this Constitution, the Laws of the
19. See O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. at 87.
20. Even under the traditional rules allowing for the survival of established common law
following passage of a comprehensive statute, the common law is inherently limited. Unlike
constitutional precedent, Congress may change judicially created rules it finds inimicable. This
Comment argues, however, that Congress must act affirmatively and explicitly in order to exer-
cise this power.
21. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1994 & Supp.II 1996) (imposing a jurisdictional amount of $75,000.00 in addition to the re-
quirement of diversity of citizenship).
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United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Author-
ity.' '22 Within their areas of jurisdiction, federal courts have the power to create
common law. The common law tradition has evolved to give courts the power to
"fashion law for the litigants before" them.23 "In fashioning it for them, [the court]
will be fashioning it for others." 24 In this respect, common law moves beyond an
interpretation of statute or administrative rule to the creation of new rules of deci-
sion.25 In federal courts, this power was initially quite broad. In Swift v. Tyson 2 6
the Supreme Court construed § 34 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, requiring federal
courts to regard "as rules of decision in trials at common law in the Courts of the
United States" the "laws of the several states."2 7 The Court held that "[iun the
ordinary use of language it will hardly be contended that the decisions of Courts
constitute laws."'2 8 Consequently, federal courts were free both to construe the
statutes of the states independently of the construction given them by state courts
and, when there was no statute covering the facts before the court, to create inde-
pendently the common law rule of decision.
In 1938, these broad powers were curtailed when the Supreme Court decided
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.29 Tompkins had instituted a diversity suit against
the railroad, alleging that the negligence of the railroad caused the injury he sus-
tained when he was struck by a freight train whilp walking on the railroad's right
of way.30 The railroad contended that under Pennsylvania common law, its duty to
Tompkins was that owed to a trespasser, and consequently, Tompkins could not
prove facts sufficient to allow recovery.3 1 Tompkins argued that because there
was no Pennsylvania statute covering the duty owed to one walking on a railroad's
right of way "the railroad's duty and liability is to be determined in federal courts
as a matter of general law."32 The court rejected this argument and declared that
22. U.S. CoMsT. art. III, § 2. See also, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (-he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States."). Although the language in this section is similar to that in the Constitution,
courts have recognized important differences in the meaning of the two. The constitutional
language has been read expansively so that any case or controversy that might call for the appli-
cation of federal law could conferjurisdiction. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.
326,334-36,9 Wheat. 737,758-60 (1824). The actual statutory grant, however, is much more
limited, requiring "that the federal question must appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint
and may not enter in anticipation of a defense." See Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461
U.S. 480,494 (1983).
23. B wA~m CARDozo, THE NATmUR oFtm JuDiCIAL PRocass 21 (1921).
24. Id.
25. See Atherton v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 117 S. CL 666,670 (1997) (discussing "what
one might call 'federal common law' in the strictest sense, Le., a rule of decision that amounts,
not simply to an interpretation of a federal statute or a properly promulgated administrative rule,
but, rather, to the judicial 'creation' of a special federal rule of decision").
26. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
27. Id. at 18 (quoting § 34 of the 1789 Judiciary Act). Until 1875 there was no federal
question subject matter jurisdiction; prior to that date, diversity of citizenship was the only way
for a federal court to take jurisdiction.
28. Id.
29. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
30. See id. at 69.
31. See id. at 70.
32. Id
33. Id. at 78.
"[tihere is no federal general common law."3 3 The Court noted that "[t]he federal
courts [had improperly] assumed, in the broad field of 'general law,' the power to
declare rules of decision which Congress was confessedly without power to enact
as statutes." 34 With this decision, the broad power of the federal courts to create
common law was severely restricted.
Erie, however, did not mean the end of all federal common law. Erie stands
for the proposition that
law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some
definite authority behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a State,
whether called common law or not, is not the common law generally but the law
of that State existing by the authority of that State without regard to what it may
have been in England or anywhere else. 35
Even without the broad idea of a universally applicable "general common
law," federal courts could continue to exercise their "common law" powers so
long as they were promulgating rules of decision under the authority of the United
States. As Erie itself stated, "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Consti-
tution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State." 3 6 When faced with a federal question not answered by a statute, Erie left
open the possibility that the federal courts could fashion their own rule of deci-
sion.37
This power, however, has never been broadly construed and has instead been
limited to certain specific instances:
mhe Court has recognized the need and authority in some limited areas to for-
mulate what has come to be known as "federal common law." These instances
are "few and restricted," and fall into essentially two categories: those in which a
federal rule of decision is "necessary to protect uniquely federal interests," and
those in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive
law.38
Absent a congressional directive to the courts to make common law, a federal
court, before creating common law, must decide whether it is faced with one of the
"few areas, involving 'uniquely federal interests,'...so committed by the Constitu-
34. Id. at 72.
35. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S.
518, 533-34 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
36. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 78.
37. As Justice Jackson stated in his famous concurrence to D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Fed-
eral Deposit Ins. Corp., discussed infra at notes 82-103 and accompanying text:
I do not understand Justice Brandeis's statement in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 at 78, that "There is no federal general common law," to deny that the com-
mon law may in proper cases be an aid to, or the basis of, decision of federal ques-
tions. In its context it means to me only that federal courts may not apply their own
notions of the common law at variance with applicable state decisions except "where
the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States [so] require or provide."
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. at 469-70 (Jackson, J., concur-
ring).
38. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (citations omit-
ted). These doctrines evolved gradually over time. See generally United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1963); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,426 (1964).
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tion and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted
and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent ex-
plicit statutory directive) by the courts-so-called 'federal common law.' 3 9 In cases
where there is an explicit statutory scheme, however, this power to create new
federal common law is curtailed. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transportation
Workers 40 and Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,4 1 the Court dealt
with the question of whether a statutory enactment allows for the creation of new
federal common law to supplement existing statutory remedies. In both cases, the
Court declined to allow the creation of such a remedy.
In Northwest Airlines, the Court was asked to create a right of contribution in
favor of Northwest. Northwest had lost a class action suit instituted by a Mary
Laffey, who argued that the wage differentials between the male cabin attendants,
classified as pursers, and the female cabin attendants, classified as stewardesses,
were in violation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.42 Northwest was ordered to pay "in excess of $20 million in back pay,
damages, and interest to the members of the Laffey plaintiff class. ' 4 3 After this
loss, Northwest brought the present action against the two unions representing the
airline workers, Transport Workers Union of America and the Air Line Pilots As-
sociation, International, reasoning that they bore "at least partial responsibility for
the statutory violations" and that Northwest had either "a federal statutory or com-
mon-law right to contribution" from the two unions.44 In Texas Industries, both
parties "manufactur[ed] and [sold] ready-mix concrete in the New Orleans, La.,
area." 45 Texas Industries, however, had been sued in 1975 by one of its customers
who had alleged a conspiracy to raise concrete prices in violation of the Sherman
Act.46 The complaint sought treble damages and attorney's fees. 47 Texas Indus-
39. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500. 504 (1988)(citations omitted). The issue in
Boyle was whether a federal contractor should be shielded as a matter of federal common law
against state tort claims allegedly arising from design defects in equipment produced for the
military. See id at 503. The Court reasoned that the protection of contractors who created their
designs under the close supervision of the military was an area of "uniquely federal" interest as
it directly affected the government's ability to get work done and procure at a reasonable cost
necessary equipment for the military. See id. at 504-07. The Court then concluded that state law
was displaced, at least in part, and designed an immunity from state law actions for design
defects in cases where the contractor had acted according to specifications given them by the
government and had warned the government of any risks connected with the equipment that the
contractor was aware of. See i. at 512. Unique federal interests have also been found in cases
where there was a controversy between two states regarding streamwater, see Hinderlider v. La
Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), where the controversy concerned the
relationship between the United States and members of its armed forces, see United States v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301,305 (1947), where the controversy implicated the liabil-
ity of federal officers for official conduct, see Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593. 597 (1959), and
where the controversy has concerned official relationships with other countries, see Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
40. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
41. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
42. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. at 80-81.
43. Id. at 82.
44. Id. at 79-80.
45. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. at 632.
46. See id. at 632.
47. See id.
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tries also brought a third party complaint asking for contribution from respon-
dents, the "other concrete producers that had participated in the alleged price-fix-
ing scheme," in the event that it was held liable against its customer. 48
The Court followed the same analysis in both Texas Industries and Northwest
Airlines. It noted that the right of contribution in both cases could be created in
one of two ways: either it was created by statute or by "the exercise of judicial
power to fashion appropriate remedies for unlawful conduct."'49 In neither case,
however, could the Court discover a right of contribution under the statutory lan-
guage.50 The Court then went on to consider whether it might fashion a remedy
outside of the statutory language and began its analysis with the premise that the
power of federal courts to fashion common law was limited. 5 1 Such a step, the
Court determined, could be undertaken where there were "'uniquely federal inter-
ests' of the kind that oblige courts to formulate federal common law.' 5 2 Even in
areas where the "federal judiciary's lawmaking power [was] at its strongest," com-
mon law powers were subordinate to Congress's power to legislate.53 The federal
judiciary's capacity to make common law had to coexist with Congress's inherent
power to legislate for the nation. When Congress had already legislated on an
issue, courts had to be circumspect in the decision to create a common law rule of
decision, lest they create a remedy that Congress had deliberately decided not to
include. In the absence of direct congressional intent, courts had to rely upon a
presumption about whether a remedy was deliberately excluded; "[tihe presump-
tion that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Con-
gress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated sys-
tem of procedures for enforcement."54 Where there was such a scheme, only di-
rect evidence to the contrary would overcome the presumption and allow courts to
create new common law rules. 55 Otherwise, a court might "fashion new remedies
that might upset carefully considered legislative programs."'56 The Court found a
48. Id. at 633.
49. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. at 90; see also Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. at 638.
50. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. at 94-95; see also Texas Indus.,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. at 639-40.
51. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. at 95; see also Texas Indus.,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. at 640.
52. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. at 642; see also Northwest Air-
lines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. at 95.
53. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. at 96; see also Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. at 641. Northwest in particular recognized admiralty as an
area of federal jurisdiction where the federal courts might feel safest in creating judge made
rules. Even there, however, courts had a duty "to respect the will of Congress." Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. at 96.
54. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. at 97 (quoted in Texas Indus., Inc.
v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. at 645).
55. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. at 97; see also Texas Indus.,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. at 645.
56. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. at 97; see also Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. at 645.
57. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. at 98; see also Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. at 646.
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comprehensive scheme in both cases and refused to create a federal common law
right of contribution. 57
In both Northwest and Texas Industries, the Court was asked to create new
common law rules of decision following the passage of a comprehensive statute.
Congress does not always have the first word on an issue. In Northwest and Texas
Industries, the Court was concerned that the creation of new common law would
upset the statutory scheme. The Court has expressed a similar concern, though
with different results, when Congress legislates in an area where a common law
rule of decision is already in existence. Congress legislates against the background
of common law. "The Court has admonished that statutes will not be construed in
derogation of the common law unless such an intent is clear."5 8 In order for this
principle to apply, however, the existing common law must be established prior to
the passage of the statute.
In Milwaukee v. Illinois,5 9 the Court established guidelines for determining
when common law could be considered created and thus when the presumption
regarding the interaction between statute and common law would change. The
state of Illinois had sued the city of Milwaukee, claiming that discharges from the
city's sewer system, in combination with inadequate treatment of sewage, was
allowing various pathogens to be released into Lake Michigan where they were
transported by lake currents to Illinois.60 Illinois had first sought, in Illinois v.
Milwaukee,6 1 to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. 62 While the
Court rejected any exercise of original jurisdiction, it nonetheless observed that
the dispute between Milwaukee and Illinois concerned interstate waters, and, there-
fore, federal law should apply.63 The statutes that had been passed by Congress at
that point did not appear to address the situation, but the Court said that such laws
were "'not necessarily the only federal remedies available' and that "Illinois could
appeal to federal common law to abate a public nuisance in interstate or navigable
waters." 64 Following that decision, "Illinois filed a complaint in United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking abatement, under fed-
eral common law, of the public nuisance [Milwaukee was] allegedly creating....
Five months later Congress ... passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
58. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 339 n.8 (1981) (Blacknun. J. dissenting) (citing
Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779,783 (1952) (holding that "[s]tatutes which invade the
common law.. .are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and
familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident')). See also
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1966) (holding that § 103 of the Patent Act was a
"codification ofjudicial precedents embracing" the prior federal common law and rejecting, for
that reason, an argument urging the Court to "find in § 103 a relaxed standard, supposedly a
congressional reaction to the 'increased standard' applied by this Court in its decisions over the
last 20 or 30 years;" instead the statute created "no change in the general strictness with which
the overall test is to be applied"); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99 (1979)
(holding that "Congress was thoroughly familiar with...precedents from this and other federal
courts and that it expected [Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972] to be interpreted in
conformity with them").
59. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
60. See id. at 309.
61. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
62. See id. at 93.
63. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 309.
64. Id. at 309-10 (quoting Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 103).
65. Id. at 310 (citations omitted).
Amendments of 1972."65 After the lower courts found, in part, for Illinois on the
basis of a federal common law of nuisance, Milwaukee appealed, thus bringing
before the Court the question of whether the statutory enactment had displaced
federal common law.66 Concluding that Congress had "occupied the field through
the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert
administrative agency," the Court decided that there was no room for the federal
judiciary to use "often vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of
equity jurisprudence" to decide the issues presented by this case.67 The Court
reached its decision through a close analysis of the statute in relation to Illinois's
claims. It noted that "the Court has been called upon to pronounce common law
that will fill the interstices of a pervasively federal framework, or avoid subjecting
relevant federal interests to the inconsistencies in the laws of several States," 6 8 but
finally concluded that "[tihere is no 'interstice' here to be filled by federal com-
mon law: overflows are covered by the Act and have been addressed by the regu-
latory regime established by the Act."'69 The statute was comprehensive, thus
preventing the lower courts from using the federal common law of nuisance to
resolve the problem as suggested by the Court in Illinois v. Milwaukee.7 0
On the other hand, where there was an established common law rule of deci-
sion, the Court has refused to find statutory displacement absent an explicit indica-
tion of such a congressional intention. In United States v. Texas,71 the Court was
asked by Texas to find that the passage of the Debt Collection Act eliminated the
common law rule that imposed prejudgment interest on states for amounts they
contractually owed the federal government.7 2 Texas had distributed food stamps
through the mail as part of its participation in the Federal Food Stamp Program. 73
The federal regulations required that a state reimburse the federal government for
all losses above a minimum level that were incurred as a result of using the mails.74
Texas was contractually obligated to follow all applicable federal regulations; it
became liable for a debt of $412,385 under these regulations when a substantial
66. See id. at 311-12.
67. Id. at 317.
68. Id. at 336.
69. ld. at 323.
70. Although the Court described its opinion as one determining the standards for when
Congress has acted to "supplant[] the federal common law..." id. at 319, and that "[o]ur 'com-
mitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental' to continue to rely on federal common
law 'by judicially decreeing what accords with "common sense and the public weal' when
Congress has addressed the problem," id. at 315, the decision is concerned with the creation of
new law. Illinois had only learned in 1972, nine years before the Court's decision, that the
federal common law of nuisance might offer it some relief. Furthermore, the Court noted that
"legislative activity resulting in the 1972 Amendments largely occurred prior to this Court's
decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee.... It is therefore difficult to argue that particular provisions
were designed to preserve a federal common-law remedy not yet recognized by this Court." Id.
at 327 n.19. No specific federal common law rule of decision was in existence at the time of the
passage of the 1972 statute and the Court was therefore preventing the creation of a new rule
that might upset the statutory scheme.
71. 507 U.S. 529 (1993).
72. See id. at 537.
73. See id. at 530-31.
74. See id. at 531. The mail program was less expensive to operate, but less secure and
resulted in replacement costs for lost or stolen food stamps. See id.
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number of mail-issued food stamps required replacement, in part because "United
States Postal employees stole food stamps that had been mailed by the Texas De-
partment of Human Services to qualified households." 75 In challenging the vital-
ity of the common law rule, Texas sought to avoid paying prejudgment interest on
the award.
In its analysis of the Debt Collection Act, the Court concluded that the Act
was "intended to enhance the Government's debt collection efforts... "76 More-
over, the language of the Act demonstrated that "the Act was intended to reach
only one subset of potential debtors-persons-and to leave the other subset
alone."77 The common law for applying prejudgment interest to the states re-
quired the courts to weigh the state and federal interests involved in the award of
prejudgment interest in each case.78 The common law was therefore more flexible
than the standard expressed in the Act. The Court concluded that the Act was
meant "to apply more stringent requirements to debts owed by private persons and
to keep the more flexible common law in place for debts owed by state and local
governments." 79 Without an indication in the statute of an intent to displace, the
common law survived the passage of theAct.80 Texas was obliged to pay prejudg-
ment interest on its debt owed to the federal government. 8 1
It is within this federal common law context that any examination of the inter-
action between the D'Oench common law rule of decision and FIRREA must be
examined. These common law principles indicate that the underlying policy con-
sideration is a concern that federal courts not upset a carefully crafted legislative
enactment. As the Supreme Court as indicated, however, this policy does not al-
ways mandate the abrogation of the judiciary's common law rule-making power.
When the common law precedes the statutory enactment, Congress is required to
take affirmative action to eliminate the common law rule. Any analysis of the
potential displacement of established federal common law thus requires an under-
standing both of the genesis of the common law rule and the congressional inten-
tion underlying the recent enactment.
I. THE INTERACTIONS BETVEEN THE D'OENCH COMMON LAW RULE AND ITS
STATUTORY CODIFICATION.
Both the D'Oench common law rule and its statutory codification offer pro-
tection to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) when it acts after the
failure of a lending institution. These two rules have developed side by side since
the first codification of the D'Oench rule in 1950. It has only been relatively
recently, following the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in 1989, that an argument has been made for
preemption of the common law rule.82 To understand this argument, it is first
necessary to examine the history and development of the D'Oench substantive
rule.
75. Id. at 531-32.
76. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 537 (1993).
77. Id. at 536.
78. See id. at 533.
79. Id. at 536.
80. See id. at 539.
81. See id.
82. See Murphy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 61 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1995); DiVall Insured
Income Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Boatmen's First Nat'l Bank, 69 F.3d 1398 (8th Cir. 1995).
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A. The Common Law Rule.
The common law rule was first developed by the United States Supreme Court
in D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.83 D'Oench
concerned an action on a demand note for $5000 given to the Belleville Bank &
Trust Co. (Belleville) in 1933 by D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. (D'Oench, Duhme
& Co.) in renewal of notes originally executed in 1926.84 The FDIC had acquired
the note in 1938 as collateral for a $1,000,000.00 loan made to Belleville, which
was "made in connection with the assumption of the latter's deposit liabilities by
another bank."' 85 D'Oench, Duhme & Co. was in the securities business and had
sold Belleville a number of bonds that had later defaulted. The note was given and
interest payments were made to keep the notes as "live paper" so that the past due
bonds would never appear as assets on Belleville's books.86 Belleville had given
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. a receipt for the bonds that stated that "[t] his note is given
with the understanding it will not be called for payment. All interest payments to
be repaid."'87 Although Belleville's president knew of the agreement not to sue on
the notes, this information was never communicated to the FDIC.8 8
After Belleville defaulted on the loan made to it by the FDIC, the corporation
sought to recoup its loss by demanding payment from D'Oench, Duhme & Co. In
response to this demand, D'Oench, Duhme & Co. raised the defense that the note
was given without consideration and that the secret agreement between it and
Belleville barred the FDIC from any recovery. 89 D'Oench, Duhme & Co. alleged
that Belleville's agreement not to call the note for payment should also bind the
83. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
84. See id. at 454.
85. Id. Under the terms of the loan transaction, the FDIC was authorized to try to attempt
collection in its own name on any collateral should there be a default on the payment of the
principal. Belleville Bank defaulted and the FDIC instituted this action after demanding pay-
ment of the note. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 117 F.2d 491,492
(8th Cir. 1941).
86. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. at 454. The bonds were
drainage district bonds, and when they went into default, the bank requested D'Oench, Duhme
& Co. to execute two demand notes in an amount equal to the face of the bonds. The bonds were
to be carried as "purported collateral" for the notes. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 117 F.2d at 492. The notes were originally executed in St. Louis and "con-
tained a recital that they were negotiable and payable at the office of [D'Oench, Duhme & Co.]
in that city. The contents of the intermediate renewal notes are not shown. The [present note]
consolidated the amounts of the original notes and.. .was dated Belleville, Illinois, and was made
payable at the office of the Belleville Bank & Trust Co. in that city." Id.
87. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. at 454.
88. See id The notes had been among the charged off assets of the bank since 1935. See id.
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. attempted to raise the issue that this status of the note provided notice
of an infirmity and therefore should have defeated any claim by the FDIC that it was an holder
in due course. The lower courts rejected this argument, noting that "[the charging off of com-
mercial paper by a bank does not necessarily imply an infirmity in the instrument or a defect in
the bank's title, and without other circumstances, is not knowledge of such facts that the
transferee's action in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith under the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law." D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 117 F.2d at 494. The
Supreme Court, though affirming on different grounds, essentially agreed that a charged off note
did not cease to become an asset that the FDIC would have relied upon when insuring the Belleville
Bank. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. at 461.
89. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. at 456.
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FDIC. In addition, the FDIC was, according to D'Oench, Duhme & Co., not a
holder in due course and therefore took the note subject to the maker's defenses. 90
Arguing that the Missouri law applied to this contract, D'Oench, Duhme & Co.
contended that the application of this law would bar any recovery by the FDIC.9 1
The district court rejected D'Oench, Duhme & Co.'s choice of law argument, de-
ciding instead that the law of Illinois should provide the rule of decision.92 Under
Illinois law, the district court held that the FDIC "had the status of a holder in due
course.' 93 D'Oench, Duhme & Co. was therefore liable on the note and judgment
was entered accordingly.94 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit again rejected the choice
of law argument, noting that "an accommodation note, like any written instrument,
is subject to competent modification. And where, on a renewal of accommodation
paper, its terms and recitations are so changed as to make applicable other or dif-
ferent principles of law, their effect cannot be escaped by mere inferences from the
original paper."95 Determining that the renewal note had been executed in Illinois
and that there were no other controlling provisions in it, the court held that Illinois
law controlled the contract.96
The Eighth Circuit then turned to the issue of whether the FDIC stood as a
holder in due course in reference to this note. Referring to the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law97 as it was then in force in Illinois, the court noted that a holder
cannot be a holder in due course when the note is taken after an "unreasonable
length of time after its issue.... ,98 Illinois courts, however, had not applied this
standard to accommodation notes. A holder of such notes could become a holder
90. See id. A holder in due course takes an instrument free of all except the "real" defenses
the maker of the instrument may have against enforcement. See U.C.C. § 3-302 (1990). In
order to become a holder in due course, the holder must take an instrument without apparent
evidence of forgery or alteration and "(i) for value, (ii) in good faith, (iii) without notice that the
instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or that there is an uncured default .... (iv) without
notice that the instrument contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered, (v) without
notice of any claim to the instrument.... and (vi) without notice that any party has a defense or
claim in recoupment... U.C.C. § 3-302 (a) (1990). For a further explanation of the holder in
due course concept and its specific relation to the FDIC. see infra note 112.
91. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. at 455. D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. argued that the original notes were executed in Missouri and that as such, they
and all that followed from them were contracts falling under Missouri law. See D'Oench, Duhme
& Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 117 F.2d at 492. Missouri law would bar recovery because
"[t]he note showed on its face that it was nonnegotiable, and at the time the Bank closed was in
default...as to principal. This, under Missouri law, charged [the FDIC] with notice of defenses."
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. at 450. If the FDIC had notice
of the defenses, then, contrary to the Circuit Court of Appeals ruling, the FDIC was not the
equivalent of a holder in due course entitled to recover. See id. at 455.
92. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. at 455.
93. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 117 F.2d at 492.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 493. The Supreme Court characterized this decision as one of applying general
law to determine which law should apply. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp., 315 U.S. at 455.
97. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments law is the precursor to Article 3 of the U.C.C. See
U.C.C. Art. 3, Prefatory Note (1990).
98. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 117 F.2d at 493 (quoting § 53 of
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law).
in due course even if the notes had been taken after maturity.99 The court dis-
missed D'Oench, Duhme & Co.'s contention that five years was an unreasonable
length of time. Instead the court held that the FDIC was a holder in due course
under Illinois law and therefore took free and clear from the defenses asserted in
this case. 10 0
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed on
different grounds. Since "[t]he jurisdiction of the District Court in this case...is
not based on diversity of citizenship" but was instead taken under the authority of
an "Act of Congress," 10 1 the Supreme Court held that federal common law rather
than the law of Illinois or Missouri should supply the rule of decision for this
case. 102 The Court found in the Federal Reserve Act a "federal policy to protect
[the FDIC], and the public funds which it administers, against misrepresentations
as to the securities or other assets in the portfolios of the banks which [the FDIC]
insures or to which it makes loans." 10 3 Basing its decision upon that policy, the
Court held that D'Oench, Duhme & Co. was estopped from pleading the secret
agreement between it and the bank as a defense to its obligation on the note. Se-
cret agreements between a bank and a third party hindered the FDIC in its efforts
to safeguard the banking system. If it could not depend upon a bank's books, the
FDIC could not quickly and efficiently make decisions about insurance or loans.
In order to further the federal policy of protecting the FDIC, secret agreements
could not be pled as a defense to the obligation on an asset of the bank that was
acquired by the FDIC through a purchase and assumption transaction. Moreover,
it was not necessary that the parties specifically intend to deceive the FDIC. "The
test is whether the note was designed to deceive the creditors or the public author-
ity, or would tend to have that effect. It would be sufficient in this type of case that
the maker lent himself to a scheme or arrangement whereby the banking authority
99. See idL
100. Id. at 493.
101. The Court cited 12 U.S.C. § 2640) which stated that "[a]il suits of a civil nature at
common law or in equity to which the Corporation shall be a party shall be deemed to arise
under the laws of the United States...." D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
315 U.S. at 455 n.2. Justice Jackson argued that this section of the statute not only conferred
jurisdiction upon federal courts, but also allowed those courts to make law in areas where the
statute was silent. See id. at 467-68, see also Santoni v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 677 F.2d
174, 178 (1st Cir. 1982) (looking to Jackson's concurrence for guidance in shaping the content
of federal common law). In the specific case at hand, Jackson noted that
no federal statute purports to define the Corporation's rights as holder of the note in
suit or the liability of the maker thereof. There arises, therefore, the question whether
in deciding the case we are bound to apply the law of some particular state or whether,
to put it bluntly, we may make our own law from materials found in common-law
sources.
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. at 468. For Justice Jackson,
the choice was a simple one:
Federal law is no juridical chameleon, changing complexion to match that of each
state wherein lawsuits happen to be commenced because of the accidents of service of
process and of the application of the venue statutes. It is found in the federal Consti-
tution, statutes, or common law. Federal common law implements the federal Consti-
tution and statutes, and is conditioned by them.
Id. at 471-72 (footnote omitted).
102. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. at 455-56.
103. Id. at 457.
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on which respondent relied in insuring the bank was or was likely to be
misled." 104
B. Statutory Enactments and Judicial Gloss
In 1950 Congress amended the FDIC act.10 5 In this amendment of the origi-
nal 1933 act, Congress added 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).1 06 This section was roughly
consistent with D'Oench, though there were important differences when the stat-
ute was compared to the judicial expansion of the D'Oench rule. As enacted in
1950, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) did not apply to the FDIC when it acts as receiver of a
bank, nor did it apply to the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).
The legislative history of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), however, does not mention D'Oench,
prompting the courts interpreting the section to conclude that there was no dis-
placement of the common law by the 1950 amendments. 107
104. Id. at 460. The creation of the D'Oench rule is consistent with the rules regarding the
creation of federal common law outlined in the text, supra, accompanying notes 14-19. D'Oench
was decided four years after Erie and the Court clearly had that decision in mind when reaching
its decision. See id. at 455. The Court first examined the federal interest in protecting the FDIC,
and only created a common law rule of decision after determining that the interest was signifi-
cant. See id. at 456- 57.
105. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 et seq.
106. The text of old § 1823(e) was:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the right, title or interest of the Cor-
poration in any asset acquired by it under this section, either as security for a loan or
by purchase, shall be valid against the Corporation unless such agreement (I) shall be
in writing, (2) shall have been executed by the bank and the person or persons claim-
ing an adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the
acquisition of the asset by the bank, (3) shall have been approved by the board of
directors of the bank or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the
minutes of said board or committee, and (4) shall have been, continuously, from the
time of its execution, an official record of the bank.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(e) (West 1989). As enacted, this section imposed strict requirements
upon any agreement that might be allowed to defeat the FDIC's interest in an asset of the bank.
It is important to note, though, the use of the word "asset." This provides a much broader level
of protection to the FDIC than that provided holders in due course under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. Unlike the federal holder in due course doctrine, the word "asset" does not require a
finding of negotiability for the FDIC's interest to be protected. See Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Kennelly, 57 F.3d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting defendant's argument that the variable
interest rate on the note sued upon by the RTC removed negotiability of the note under Pennsyl-
vania law; the court noted that whether or not this was a correct statement of the law, the issue
was irrelevant in a D'Oenchl§ 1823 analysis); see also Randolf v. Resolution Trust Corp., 995
F.2d 611, 614-15 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (holding it "unnecessary to decide whether these
notes are negotiable, as the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine may defeat Plaintiffs [sic] defenses to
collection regardless of negotiability"), Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 937 F.2d 845.
855 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that "[s]ection 1823(e) requires only that the RTC have an 'interest'
which the alleged agreement could diminish or defeat"; the issue of the holder in due course
status of the RTC was therefore irrelevant); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. P.L.. Intern., Inc.,
834 F.2d 248,255 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that "section 1823(e) covers nonnegotiable as well as
negotiable instruments").
107. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 514 n.l (5th Cir. 1986)
(reasoning that with no mention of D'Oench in the legislative history, "there is no reason to
suppose that Congress intended to forbid the rule of estoppel from being applied" in areas the
statute did not reach).
MAINE LAW REVIEW
After concluding there was no displacement by the 1950 amendment, most
courts, until recently, applied 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) and the common law as two
overlapping tools available to the FDIC when it seeks to recover funds due upon
notes it has acquired after a bank fails. 108 There are two routes available to the
FDIC when it steps in as receiver for a depositary institution after the Comptroller
of the Currency has declared that particular institution insolvent.
As receiver, the FDIC manages the assets of the failed bank on behalf of the
bank's creditors and shareholders. In its corporate capacity, the FDIC is respon-
sible for insuring the failed bank's deposits. Although there are many options
available to the FDIC when a bank fails, these options generally fall within the
two categories of approaches, either liquidation or purchase and assumption. The.
liquidation option is the easiest method, but carries with it two major disadvan-
tages. First, the closing of the bank weakens confidence in the banking system.
Second, there is often substantial delay in returning funds to depositors.
The preferred option when a bank fails, therefore, is the purchase and assumption
option. Under this arrangement, the FDIC, in its capacity as receiver, sells the
bank's healthy assets to the purchasing bank in exchange for the purchasing bank's
promise to pay the failed bank's depositors. In addition, as receiver, the FDIC
sells the 'bad' assets to itself acting in its corporate capacity. With the money it
receives, the FDIC-receiver then pays the purchasing bank enough money to make
up the difference between what it must pay out to the failed bank's depositors,
and what the purchasing bank was willing to pay for the good assets that it pur-
chased. The FDIC acting in its corporate capacity then tries to collect on the bad
assets to minimize the loss to the insurance fund. Generally, the purchase and
assumption must be executed in great haste, often over-night. 109
As mentioned above, the original enactment of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) only ap-
plied when the FDIC executed a purchase and assumption. In this respect, it mir-
rored D'Oench which was decided after the FDIC had executed a purchase and
assumption with Belleville Bank and thus was arguably limited to those situa-
tions.1 10 The federal courts, however, quickly expanded the common law rule to
cover situations omitted by the original statutory language. The federal courts
used D'Oench to protect the FDIC from secret agreements even when it was acting
in its receivership capacity during a liquidation.'11 The FSLIC has been given
108. See Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d 1317, 1326 n.7 (11 th Cir.
1996) (en bane) ("Courts that expanded the D'Oench doctrine often applied the common law
and § 1823(e)(1) in tandem, reasoning that 'the purposes of D'Oench and section 1823(e) were
the same, and therefore.. .the same analysis [applies] regardless of whether the party involved in
the case was the FDIC or another federal banking regulator.' Cases interpreting either common
law D'Oench or § 1823(e)(1) were both considered precedent.") (citations omitted) (quoting
Baumann v. Savers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 934 F.2d 1506, 1515 (1 Ith Cir. 1991)). In the vast
majority of cases cited in this comment, the court begins by analyzing 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1)
and then applied D'Oench to any remaining issues. See, e.g., Howell v. Continental Credit
Corp., 655 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1981); Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 60
F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 1995).
109. Timberland Design, Inc. v. First Service Bank For Say., 932 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1991)
(citations omitted). See also Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865-66 (11th Cir. 1982) (de-
scribing the purchase and assumption transaction and noting that it must be "consummated with
great speed").
110. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 454 (1942).
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D'Oench protection, whether acting in its corporate or its receivership status.112
Defenses based upon an improper acknowledgement of a mortgage have been
barred, even though under state law the mortgage would have been voidable. 113
In perhaps the largest extension of the doctrine, some courts have used the policy
justifications behind D'Oench to create the federal holder in due course doctrine,
giving the FDIC holder in due course-status when it takes instruments as part of a
purchase and assumption.1 14
111. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bernstein, 944 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1991).
112. See Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Two Rivers Assocs, 880 F.2d 1267, 1274-75
(llth Cir. 1989).
113. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. McCullough, 911 F.2d 593.602 (11 th Cir. 1990). cerr.
denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991). In McCullough, the mortgage was notarized by a notary who was
not present at the time of signing. See id The Eleventh Circuit noted that while "the error in
acknowledgement might render the mortgage voidable were this suit involving two private par-
ties litigating under state law," the D'Oench common law rule barred the defense. Id. The
mortgage appeared valid on its face, thus preventing bank examiners from knowing of the pos-
sible infirmity and implicating D'Oench policy considerations. See id.
114. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 161 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 944 (1985). Under state law, the FDIC would not normally be entitled to holder in due
course status after a purchase and assumption. The Uniform Commercial Code, for instance,
exempts from holder in due course status anyone who takes possession of an instrument "(i) by
legal process or by purchase in an execution, bankruptcy, or creditor's sale or similar proceed-
ing, (ii) by purchase as part of a bulk transaction not in ordinary course of business of the
transferor, or (iii) as the successor in interest to an estate or other organization." U.C.C. § 3-
302(c) (1990); see also § 3-302 cmt. 5 (1990) ("[Slubsection (c) may be preempted by federal
law if the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation takes over an insolvent bank. Under the gov-
erning federal law, the FDIC and similar financial institution insurers are given holder in due
course status and that status is also acquired by their assignees under the shelter doctrine."). The
genesis of the holder in due course doctrine has been traced back to Gunter %, Hutcheson, where
the maker of a note sought to rescind it on the basis of fraud and securities law violations. See
Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (1 Ith Cir.), cer. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982). See also In Re
604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust, 968 F2d 1332, 1350-53 (1st Cir. 1992). The Gunter court,
noting the need for speed inherent in any purchase and assumption transaction, held that the
FDIC should be treated like a holder in due course, thus cutting off the defenses sought to be
asserted in this case. Itjustified its holding by noting that subjecting the FDIC to fraud claims of
which it had no knowledge would only inhibit its ability to fulfill what the court saw as a statu-
tory requirement in 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) to execute a purchase and assumption, as opposed to a
liquidation, whenever possible. See Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d at 870. It further noted that
such a holding, as it merely put the FDIC in the same position as a holder in due course, did not
upset note makers' expectations since the holder of the note could always negotiate it to a holder
in due course. See id. at 872.
There are important differences between this doctrine and D'Oench. In many respects D'Oench
is the broader of the two, particularly as it has been interpreted by the courts and codified by
Congress. See supra note 100. As it now stands, it applies to any asset of the bank, whether or
not negotiable and whether or not the FDIC is acting in its corporate or its receiver status. See
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. P.L.M. Int'l, Inc., 834 F.2d 248,254 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that a
letter of guaranty was an asset under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) and that defenses based on secret
agreements were barred whether or not the asset was a negotiable instrument). The federal
holder in due course doctrine, however, can only apply to instruments that are negotiable under
state law. See Sunbelt Sav., FSB v. Montross, 923 F.2d 353, 356, modified on other grounds by
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Montross, 944 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1991). Nor have many courts been
willing to extend holder in due course protection to the FDIC when it acts as a receiver. See In
Re 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust, 968 F.2d 1332, 1350-53 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that, since
the underlying rationale of the federal holder in due course doctrine is "to promote purchase and
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Likewise, the courts usually adopted, in keeping with the policy concerns that
had motivated the original D'Oench decision, a broad interpretation of 12 U.S.C. §
1823(e) to add further protection to the FDIC. The section has been applied to bar
claims based upon fraud in the inducement, 115 based upon agreements between
obligors and third parties,1 16 and based upon a letter from a bank official indicat-
ing that a trust was irrevocable. 117 Prior to 1987, these broad interpretations were
not universally approved. For instance, in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v.
Meo, 118 the Ninth Circuit created an innocent maker exception, holding that the
"bank borrower who was neither a party to any deceptive scheme involving, nor
negligent with respect to, circumstances giving rise to the claimed defense to his
note is not estopped from asserting such defense against the bank's receiver." 119
Some courts also held that the term "agreement" in 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) did not
apply to agreements about whether one party was or was not a surety.120 Other
courts held that the diminishment of the FDIC's interests must be contained in a
assumption transactions," the doctrine is inapplicable to the FDIC when it is acting as receiver);
see also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Houde, 90 F.3d 600 (1st Cir. 1996); Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Laguarta, 939 F.2d 1231, 1239 n.19 (5th Cir. 1991). But see, Campbell Leasing, Inc. v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 901 F.2d 1244, 1249 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding federal common law
holder in due course rule applicable whether FDIC acting in its corporate or receiver capacity);
Firstsouth, F.A. v. Aqua Constr., Inc., 858 F.2d 441,443 (8th Cir. 1988).
115. See McGlothlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 913 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.D.C. 1996) (denying
relief to plaintiffs who alleged that they had been fraudulently induced by an agent of the failed
bank to sign a promissory note relating to a construction project undertaken by their son's busi-
ness; the signatures were gained through oral representations by the agent and those representa-
tions were barred under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)).
116. See Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 937 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 1991); DiMuzio v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 68 F.3d 777 (3d Cir. 1995).
117. See Suzan Tantleff Trusts v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 938 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1996).
The issue in Suzan Tantleffconcerned the amount of federal insurance available to the beneficia-
ries of three trusts that had been kept in deposit at the American Commerce National Bank. See
id. at 15. When the bank failed, the FDIC examined the trusts to determine whether they were
revocable or irrevocable. The decision had a material effect upon the amount of depositary
insurance available. See id. at 16. After first determining the trusts were irrevocable and thus
eligible for a higher level of insurance, the FDIC reversed itself, pointing to language in the trust
that seemed to make the trust revocable. See id. Among other theories, plaintiffs argued that the
FDIC should be estopped from determining the trusts were revocable by pointing to a letter sent
by one of ACNB's officers stating that the trusts were irrevocable. See id. at 19. The court held
that such an argument was prevented by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e). See id. at 20.
118. 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974).
119. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meo, 505 F.2d at 793. The Meo decision has been referred
to as creating an "innocent borrower exception" to the D'Oench rule. See In Re 604 Columbus
Ave. Realty Trust, 968 F.2d at 1347-48. A number of courts, referring back to D'Oench, have
concluded that its plain import was to create a situation where "the borrower's state of mind is
irrelevant, because the 'proper focus under D'Oench is whether the agreement, at the time it was
entered into, would tend to mislead the public authority."' Id. at 1348. (quoting Timberland
Design v. First Serv. Bank, 932 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1991)); see also Baumann v. Savers Fed.
Sav. & Loan Assoc., 934 F.2d 1506, 1516 (Ilth Cir. 1991); Young v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
103 F.3d 1180, 1188 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Meo "innocent borrower exception" "con-
flicts with the underlying rationale of the D'Oench doctrine" and was therefore unavailable).
Many courts have concluded that the Meo analysis was "based on an outdated understanding of
the D'Oench doctrine," and did not survive the Supreme Court's decision in Langley v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 484 U.S. 86 (1987). Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Gordy, 928 F.2d
1558, 1567 n.14 (11th Cit. 1991).
120. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Blue Rock Shopping Ctr., Inc., 766 F.2d 744 (CA 3
1985). The court held that the types of agreements covered by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) are those
between obligor and bank "showing or attempting to show that the obligation was illusory or
conditional." Id. at 754.
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separate agreement; where the defense arises from a bilateral agreement-the de-
fense arising from the breach of that agreement by the FDIC, on its own or as
successor in interest-some courts have found that 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) is not
implicated and cannot serve to bar that particular defense. 12 1 These courts took a
very narrow view of the term "agreement" and used it to exclude various situations
from protection under the statute.
In 1987, however, the Supreme Court rejected this narrow view of the term
"agreement" and brought statutory interpretation closer to the breadth already ac-
corded the common law rule. In Langley v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,122
the Court allowed the use of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) to prevent a defense based upon
the alleged violation of certain warranties made by the underlying bank regarding
a plot of land. The Langleys had purchased land in Louisiana and sought to fi-
nance the purchase with a loan from Planters Trust & Savings Bank (Planters).
After the Langleys missed a payment on the note, Planters filed suit. This suit was
removed to federal court and consolidated with a lawsuit brought by the Langleys
against Planters. 123 The Langleys argued that the note had been procured through
misrepresentations about the land and the mineral acres present in the tract.124
Planters was declared insolvent shortly thereafter and the FDIC stepped in as re-
ceiver. A purchase and assumption transaction followed in which the FDIC be-
came the possessor of the Langleys' note. The FDIC was substituted for Planters
as plaintiff in the action to recover on the note. 125 After this substitution, the
Langleys' argued that the term "agreement" should be narrowly construed to "en-
compass[] only an express promise to perform an act in the future." 126
In responding to the Langley's argument, the Court held that the term "agree-
ment' should be taken at its normal meaning, which went beyond simple prom-
ises, and that under such a definition, the term could "embrac[e] such a condition
upon performance" as a warranty.12 7 Moreover, the "leading case in this area
prior to enactment of § 1823(e) in 1950," D'Oench, also had adopted a broad view
121. See Howell v. Continental Credit Corp., 655 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1981). In Howell the
court dealt with a case where there was a bilateral agreement visible on the face of the lease that
the bank, Continental Credit Corp., was to purchase certain equipment. When the FDIC sued to
recover payments under the lease, Howell raised as a defense the failure of the bank to purchase
the equipment. The court noted that the terms that tend to diminish the FDIC's rights are in the
very document which creates those rights, thus 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) is not implicated because
there is no secret agreement separate from the asset that is diminishing the FDIC's rights in the
asset. See id at 747 (citing Riverside Park Realty Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 465 F.
Supp. 305,313 (M.D. Tenn. 1978)).
122. 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
123. See id. at 88.
124. See id at 89.
125. See id The FDIC had notice of the lawsuit prior to its obtaining the note. See id.
Reasoning that "[t]he harm to the FDIC caused by the failure to record occurs no later than the
time at which it conducts its first bank examination that is unable to detect the unrecorded
agreement and to prompt the invocation of available protective measures, including termination
of the bank's deposit insurance," the Court denied the Langleys' argument that the FDIC had
knowledge of a defense and that such knowledge should allow the maker to assert that defense.
Id at 95. "An agreement that meets [the requirements of § 1823(e)] prevails even if the FDIC
did not know of it; and an agreement that does not meet them fails even if the FDIC knew." Id.
126. Id. at 90.
127. See id. at 91.
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of what an agreement was. 1 2 8 "We can safely assume that Congress did not mean
'agreement' in § 1823(e) to be interpreted so much more narrowly than its permis-
sible meaning as to disserve the principle of the leading case applying that term to
FDIC-acquired notes." 12 9
The Court also discerned in the statute the twin purposes of allowing the FDIC
and other banking authorities to rely upon the written records of the bank and of
"ensur[ing] mature consideration of unusual loan transactions by senior bank offi-
cials, and prevent[ing] fraudulent insertion of new terms, with the collusion of
bank employees, when a bank appears headed for failure." 130 Based upon these
purposes and its broad reading of the word "agreement," the Court held that 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e) barred almost all defenses based upon an underlying agreement
where there was an asset, whether or not the FDIC had knowledge of the agree-
ment. 13 1 The Court, however, did leave open the possibility for the maker to as-
sert fraud in the factum as a defense to the obligation on the instrument. In its
analysis of this defense, the Court distinguished fraud in the inducement from
fraud in the factum and based its distinction upon the question of whether there
was an asset left to be diminished. 132 If a defendant alleged fraud in the factum,
that is, a fraud that caused the maker to sign without knowing what it was they
were signing, then the instrument would be void, "thus leaving no 'right, title or
interest' that could be 'diminish[ed] or defeat[ed].' 13 3 On the other hand: fraud
in the inducement merely made the instrument voidable, and a "bank therefore had
and could transfer to the FDIC voidable title, which is enough to constitute 'title or
interest' in the note."'134
C. THE 1989 AMENDMENTS
In 1989 Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act (FIRREA). FIRREA was enacted during the savings and loan
crisis and was specifically designed to shore up "public confidence in the savings
and loan industry in order to ensure a safe, stable, and viable system of affordable
housing finance." 135 As of the end of 1988, the savings and loan industry had
suffered numerous setbacks. Congress found that "[tihe nation's thrift industry
128. Id. at 92.
129. Id. at 92-93.
130. Id
131. See id. at93.
132. See id. at 93-94.
133. Id. Absent compliance with the four-fold requirements of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), this
appears to be the only defense left after Langley that may be asserted on the basis of oral proof.
Despite numerous attempts to use this argument, courts have rarely accepted it, finding in most
cases only fraud in the inducement. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d
51, 59 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding the defendants' allegations of fraud in the factum instead indicate
only fraud in the inducement).
134. Langley v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 484 U.S. at 94 (1987). Following Langley,
commentators have seen little difference in terms of the types of agreements giving rise to a
defense barred by the statute as compared to the common law. See W. Robert Gray, Limitations
on the FDIC's D'Oench Doctrine of Federal Common-Law Estoppel: Congressional Preemp-
tion on Authoritative Statutory Construction, 31 S. Tax. L. REv. 245, 271 (1990). Gray also
discerned an implicit overruling of Meo in Langley. See id.
135. H.R. REP. No. 101-54[I], at 307 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 87, 103.
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and its deposit insurance fund, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpora-
tion are currently in precarious financial condition and consumer confidence in the
savings and loan industry is waning." 136 The industry's "precarious financial con-
dition" was widely known, with numerous newspapers reporting on the problem.
In the last months of 1988, it was widely reported that over 500 federally insured
thrifts were identified as insolvent. 137 Estimates of the eventual cost of resolving
the problem ranged from $50 to $100 billion. 13 8 Most writers felt that a taxpayer
bailout would be necessary, and at least one economist was viewing the crisis as
having the potential to create a recession that "'could snowball into something
much more dangerous because of the big debt buildup and the growing savings
and loan and banking crises."' 139 Indeed, Congress believed that "[t]he Bank
Board and the Reagan Administration continually understated the magnitude of
the S&L crisis, effectively delaying its resolution and needlessly adding billions of
dollars to the cost of resolving the problem." 140 Moreover, Congress felt that
there had been a conflict of interest within the Bank Board which oversaw the
FSLIC. "[T]he Bank Board's record of relaxing capital standards and a lack of
enforcement actions against thrift operators" had led in part to an escalation of the
thrift crisis. 14 1 There was a widespread belief that the escalating thrift crisis would
soon cause the bankruptcy of the FSLIC. 142 FIRREA was meant to address the
breakdown and potential collapse of both the Savings & Loan industry and its
enforcement arm.
This collapse of the thrifts concerned Congress because it saw the thrift indus-
try as a major way in which funds were made available to home buyers. The thrift
industry's purpose had always been to "provide the American people with afford-
able mortgage credit." 14 3 Some commentators, concerned about the projected
cost of taxpayer assistance to resolve the problem, were urging Congress to enact
"sweeping reforms.. .to prevent a recurrence of the present disaster." 144 Numer-
ous "witnesses, and other experts, [in testifying before Congress had] pointed out
the major flaws in our thrift system." 14 5 There was a concern with the public costs
136. H.R. REP. No. 101-54[I], at 302 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 87, 98.
137. See, e.g., Federal Board Defends Bailouts ofAiling S&L's, THE SANi Dmo Ut oN-TRI-
BuNE, Dec. 31, 1988, at A3, available in 1988 WVL 2502376; 6 Thrifts, $6.8 Billion Bailout/I
Investor Buys Five Texas S&Ls; Calif. Deal Finalized, Cm. SUN-TBMEs, Dec. 29, 1988, at 65,
available in 1988 WL 4699847; Jon Newberry, FSLIC's S&L Bailouts A Bonanza for Lavuyers,
USAToDAY, Dec. 29, 1988, at 2B, available in 1988 VL 5349424.
138. See Jerry Knight, $8 Billion in S&L Rescues Set: Crisis Feared Underestimated, VAsn.
POSr, Dec. 29, 1988, at Al, available in 1988 WL 2009927; Nathanial C. Nash, 101st Congress
Faced with S&L Woes, Buyout Frenzy, J. Rma, Dec. 30, 1988, available in 1988 WL 4845756.
139. Dan Dorfman, Boom or Bust: Two Views for 1989: One Sure Thing is Uncertainty, USA
TODAY, Dec. 30, 1988, at 6B, available in 1988 VL 5349720 (quoting economist John Langum).
See also Federal Board Defends Bailouts ofAiling S&Ls, SAN DIEoo Uh~o.N-TR1BuNE, Dec. 31,
1988, at A3, available in 1988 WL 2502376; Nathanial C. Nash, 101st Congress Faced with
S&L Woes, Buyout Frenzy, J. Rc., Dec. 30, 1988, available in 1988 WIL 4845756.
140. H.R. REP. No. 101-5411, at 305 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 101.
141. H.R. REP. No. 101-54[], at 302 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86,98.
142. See H.R. REP. No. 101-54[I], at 304 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 100.
143. H.R. Rn. No. 101-54[1], at 309 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 105.
144. Savings and Loan Crisis, SANi Dmaco UNIo-TnauaN, Dec. 30, 1988, at B 10, available in
1988 WL 2502712.
145. H.R. REP. No. 101-54(1], at 307 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 103.
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of the crisis, and an emphasis that "the theme of the Committee's deliberations"
was "Never Again." 146
FIRREA was a broad reworking of the FDIC Act that, as noted by the Su-
preme Court, extensively regulated the FDIC's rights. 14 7 The Act was meant to
deal with a crisis of national proportions. 14 8 While it did change the language of
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), it is not surprising that relatively little of the legislative his-
tory discusses that change. 14 9 There is no affirmative indication that FIRREA was
intended to displace the D'Oench common law rule. 150 Instead, Congress "adopted
provisions which expand, enhance and clarify enforcement powers of the financial
institution regulatory agencies." 15 1 In changing the effect of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1),
Congress, for the most part, brought it in line with the existing common law. 152
FIRREA eliminated the FSLIC and transferred its assets to "the newly-created
146. H.R. REP. No. 101-54[1], at 310 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 106.
147. See O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79, 86 (1994) (reject-
ing the argument that FIRREA was a "nonexclusive grant of rights to the FDIC receiver which
can be supplemented or modified by federal common law" by listing the several statutory rules
of decision which cover the FDIC as receiver).
148. See Gibson v. Resolution Trust Corp., 51 F.3d 1016, 1020 (11th Cir. 1995) ("Congress
enacted FIRREA in 1989 in response to the growing crisis in the nation's banking and savings
and loan industries.").
149. See In re NBW Commercial Paper Litigation, 826 F. Supp. 1448, 1459-60 (D.D.C.
1992) (discussing the lack of legislative history aboutFIRREA's changes to 12 U.S.C, § 1823(e)(1)
and concluding that there was no intent to preempt D'Oench).
150. The same can be said of the federal holder in due course doctrine. Though Congress
knew of the existence of this doctrine, it nowhere indicated an intent that the passage of FIRREA
should displace this element of federal common law. Indeed, given the level of concern in
Congress and the country about the costs of the crisis and the desire to prevent a recurrence, it
would be counterintuitive to imply a congressional purpose to displace two common law rules
that quite clearly decrease the amount of money that the FDIC may be able to recover upon the
failure of an "insured depository institution."
151. H.R. REP. No. 101-54[1], at 311 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 107.
152. Amended 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) reads:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the Corporation in any
asset acquired by it under this section or section 1821 of this title, either as security
for a loan or by purchase or as receiver of any insured depository institution, shall be
valid against the Corporation unless such agreement-
(A) is in writing,
(B) was executed by the depository institution and any person claiming an adverse
interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of
the asset by the depository institution,
(C) was approved by the board of directors of the depository institution or its loan
committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or commit-
tee, and
(D) has been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of the
depository institution.
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) (1994). Subsection (2), which deals with agreements "provid[ing] for
the lawful collateralization of deposits of a Federal, State, or local governmental entity or of any
depositor referred to in section 1821(a)(2) of this title," was added by amendment in 1994. 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e)(2) (1994). Such agreements "shall not be deemed to be invalid pursuant to
paragraph (1)(B) solely because such agreement was not executed contemporaneously with the
acquisition of the collateral or with any changes in the collateral made in accordance with such
agreement." Id.
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FSLIC Resolution Fund (FRF) to be administered by the FDIC."15 3 Public law
101-73 changed the term "insured bank" to "insured depository institution" wher-
ever it appeared in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which included 12 U.S.C. §
1823(e)(1). 154 This change resulted in the extension of the FDIC's powers to
cover thrifts, with the exception of any thrifts placed in conservatorship or receiv-
ership between January 1, 1989 and December 31, 1995, which were to be re-
solved by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). 155 FIRREA also extended the
protection of this section to assets acquired by the FDIC when it was acting as
receiver. 156 Finally, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A) was added, which made 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e) the exclusive measure of an agreement that might be asserted as "a claim
against the receiver or the Corporation." 157 Although the specific purpose behind
the changes to § 1823(e)(1) is not clear, a desire to protect the FDIC and to mini-
mize the losses to the corporations in order to resolve the crisis and prevent future
problems does emerge. 158
D. The Supreme Court's First Interpretation of FIRREA:
A Refusal To Create New Federal Common Law.
Since the passage of FIRREA, the United States Supreme Court has had two
opportunities to rule upon its effect on federal common law. In both cases, the
Court was asked to decide the question of whether new federal common law could
be created, a question that the Court answered in the negative. Significantly, in
neither case was FIRREA's effect upon established federal common law before the
court.
1. O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.:
The Supreme Court Rejects an Appeal for New Common Law.
In 1994, O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.15 9 reached the
Supreme Court. In O'Melveny & Myers, the American Diversified Savings Bank
153. United States General Accounting Office, Financial Audit-Resolution Trust Corporation's
1995 and 1994 Financial Statements (1996), available in 1996 WL441075. It was thought that
this consolidation of the insurance agencies under the control of the FDIC would ensure they
were truly independent. See H.R. REP. No. 101- 541], at 310 (1989). reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 106.
154. See Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 201(a)(1), 103 Stat. 187 (1989).
155. See United States General Accounting Office, Financial Audit-Resolution Trust
Corporation's 1995 and 1994 Financial Statements (1996). available in 1996 VL 441075. See
also H.R. Rm. No. 101-54[1], at 310(1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 106. The RTC had
the same protections given it as the FDIC. See, e.g., Atherton v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 117
S.Ct. 666 (1997).
156. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L No.
101-73 § 217(4), 103 Stat. 256 (1989) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(d)(e)(1994)).
157. Section 1821(d)(9)(A) states: "Except as provided in subparagraph (B), any agreement
which does not meet the requirements set forth in section 1823(e) of this title shall not form the
basis of, or substantially comprise, a claim against the receiver or the Corporation." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(9)(A) (1994).
158. The changes made to 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) in combination with the addition of 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(9)(A) are consistent with a desire to protect the FDIC and to minimize future losses.
When compared to the earlier statute, the two sections expand the protection given the FDIC
when it acquires assets following a bank failure.
159. 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
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(ADSB), a federally insured savings and loan, had gone into receivership to the
FDIC in February 1986.160 ADSB had been acquired in 1983 by two investors
who had caused the thrift to "engage[] in many risky real estate transactions, prin-
cipally through limited partnerships sponsored by ADSB and its subsidiaries. ' 161
These transactions formed both the basis for this suit and the basis for the declara-
tion of insolvency that resulted in ADSB going into receivership. 162 The particu-
lar real estate transactions underlying the issue in this case had begun in Septem-
ber 1985, when O'Melveny & Myers, a "Los Angeles-based law firm, represented
ADSB in connection with two real estate syndications." 163 These.transactions
proved to be not quite what they seemed, and shortly after the FDIC stepped in as
receiver, investors besieged the receiver with demands for refunds, claiming that
they "had been deceived in connection with the two real estate syndications." 164
The FDIC brought suit against O'Melveny & Myers, claiming professional negli-
gence and breach of fiduciary duty. 165 The law firm sought summary judgment,
which was granted by the District Court but reversed by the Ninth Circuit. 166
The Supreme Court, in taking the case, first noted that the FDIC's causes of
action were all created by California law. 167 The issue before it, then, was whether
(1) a federal common-law rule and not California law determines whether the
knowledge of corporate officers acting against the corporation's interest will be
imputed to the corporation; and (2) even if California law determines the former
question, federal common law determines the more narrow question whether
knowledge by officers so acting will be imputed to the FDIC when it sues as
receiver of the corporation. 168
The Court declined to extend federal common law in either case. The first ques-
tion, the Court reasoned, was "plainly wrong," because there was "no federal gen-
eral common law," and "the remote possibility that corporations may go into fed-
eral receivership is no conceivable basis for adopting a special federal common-
law rule divesting States of authority over the entire law of imputation. ' 169 The
second question took up the bulk of the Court's analysis.
160. See O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. at 8 1-82.
161. Id. at 81.
162. See id. at 81-82. The regulators concluded that ADSB had "incurred substantial losses
because of violations of law and unsound business practices." Id.
163. Id. at 81.
164. Id. at 82.
165. See id.
166. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment after argument that the
claims asserted by the FDIC would be barred by California law and that the FDIC, as receiver,
stood in the shoes of the failed bank. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Meyers,
969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding "lilt is by now clear
beyond doubt that federal, not state, law governs the applications of defenses against the FDIC."
Id. at 751. The circuit court then "fashion[ed] a federal rule of decision" that prevented O'Melveny
& Myers from making an estoppel argument. See id. Reasoning that a receiver does not volun-
tarily step into the shoes of the bank as a normal successor in interest would, the court ruled that
federal common law required that "equitable defenses good against a bank do not carry over
against the bank's receiver." Id.
167. See O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. at 83.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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The Court framed the second question in terms of whether the California law
was displaced or could be displaced by federal law and, if it were displaced, then
what governmental entity should order the displacement.
In answering the central question of displacement of California law, [the Court]
of course would not contradict an explicit federal statutory provision. Nor would
[the Court] adopt a court-made rule to supplement federal statutory regulation
that is comprehensive and detailed; matters left unaddressed in such a scheme are
presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state law.170
The Court agreed that the passage of FIRREA demonstrated a high level of federal
interest in this area, but noted that the statute explicitly stated in 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(2)(A)(i) that the FDIC, when acting as receiver, "shall.. .by operation of
law, succeed to-all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the insured depository
institution... ,,171 When combined with several other provisions within the statute
that explicitly allowed the FDIC to escape the action of state law, the Court con-
cluded that the statute intended to place "the FDIC in the shoes of the insolvent
S&L, to work out its claims under state law, except where some provision in the
extensive frameworkof FIRREA provides otherwise."17 2 Section 1821 (d)(2)(A)(i)
was not such a provision and there was consequently no displacement of the Cali-
fornia law of imputation.
The Court, however, did not end its analysis with the conclusion that FIRREA
prevented the creation of new federal common law. Noting that the FDIC took
over as receiver in 1986 and that FIRREA was not passed until 1989, the Court
concluded that even absent FIRREA, this was not a situation in which new federal
common law should be created. 173 The FDIC was unable to identify to the Court's
satisfaction any "significant conflict with an identifiable federal policy or inter-
est." 174 The FDIC had put forth two arguments for the displacement of California
law: first, that "state rules regarding the imputation of knowledge might 'deplet[e]
the deposit insurance fund,"' and second, that "it would 'disserve the federal pro-
gram' to permit California to insulate 'the attorney's or accountant's malpractice,'
thereby imposing costs 'on the nation's taxpayers, rather than on the negligent
wrongdoer.' ' ' 17 5 The Court rejected the first argument as overly broad because
FIRREA did not state an anticipated level of the fund. 17 6 The Court reasoned that
without a set level for the fund, the only principle which would justify the FDIC's
logic must be that it was a federal policy to prevent any depletion of the fund. 17
Characterizing this as a "federal policy that the fund should always win," the Court
refused to endorse it. 178 The second argument was similarly rejected as a
"demonstrat[ion of] the runaway tendencies of 'federal common law' untethered
to a genuinely identifiable (as opposed to ajudicially constructed) federal policy." 17 9
170. lId at 85 (citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981), and
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,319 (1981)).
171. Id. at 86 (quoting 12 U.S.C. §1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (1994)).
172. Id at 87.
173. See id
174. Id at 87.
175. Id. at 88-89 (quoting Brief for Respondent, 32).
176. See id. at 88.
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 89.
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The Court then reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit finding a federal com-
mon law rule of decision and remanded the case for a resolution of the imputation
issues under California law.180
2. Atherton v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.: Erie Employed
A similar issue surfaced in 1997 when the Supreme Court decided Atherton v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.18 1 InAtherton, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)
had sued officers and directors of City Federal Savings Bank (CityFederal), claiming
that those officers and directors "had violated the legal standard of care they owed
that federally chartered, federally insured institution." 182 The RTC alleged that
the actions of these officers and directors had led to a series of bad loans being
underwritten by City Federal and that "these actions (or omissions) were unlawful
because they amounted to gross negligence, simple negligence, and breaches of
fiduciary duty." 183 The District Court had dismissed the simple negligence and
fiduciary duty claims in reliance upon 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) which established, in its
view, a gross negligence duty of care for officers and directors of a federally in-
sured savings institution. 184 The Third Circuit agreed with the import of the stat-
ute, but reversed nonetheless, arguing that there was still a federal common law
cause of action available outside of the statute which would allow the RTC to
proceed on its simple negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims. 185
Although the Supreme Court recognized that it had once created federal com-
mon law rules to govern the duty of officers and directors of federally insured
banks, the Court held that these rules had not survived Erie.186 Consequently, the
question presented by this case, in the Court's view, was whether this was one of
the "few and restricted" cases where a court-created federal rule of decision would
be justified to supplement the statutory scheme. 187 After acknowledging that this
was an area where Congress had the power to legislate, the Court found only a
weak federal need for a common law rule to supplement the statutory scheme. 188
The RTC based its major arguments for a federal common law standard of care
primarily upon the ground that the banks affected were federally chartered. This
alone should supply the reason for the creation of a common law rule,189 and if it
did not, then the federal interest in uniformity 19 0 should provide the justification.
The Court rejected the RTC's arguments, particularly the arguments based upon
180. See hi
181. 519 U.S. 213 (1997).182. Id at 215.
183. Id. at 216.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 217 (citing Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891)).
186. See id
187. See id. (quoting O'Melveny & Meyers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. at 87).
188. See id. at 219.
189. See id. at 221.
190. See id. at 219-20. The Court rejected this argument, noting that of the federally insured
banks, only half were federally chartered; any rule that created uniformity for those banks would
create a disparity between them and the state chartered banks. See id. at 220.
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the federally chartered nature of the banks, and refused to create new common
law.191 The Court based its decision on the conclusion that, if there were threats to
federal interests, they were not strong enough to warrant use of the judiciary's
common law power.192
IV. THE REFUSAL TO CREATE NEW FEDERAL COMMION LAW CREATES A RrFT IN
TBE CIRCUITS WITH RESPECr TO ESTABLISHED FEDERAL COMION LAW.
Since O'Melveny & Myers, the Circuit Courts have been faced with questions
concerning the continued vitality of D'Oench and the federal holder in due course
common law rules following the passage of FIRREA. Though it could be argued
that O'Melveny & Myers is not the correct precedent, the D. C. Circuit, in Murphy
v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,193 and the Eighth Circuit, in Di Vall Insured Income
Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Boatmen's First Nat"l Bank,194 have used the case and its
gloss on the statute to justify the destruction of these common law rules.
A. Murphy and DiVall" Established Common Law Is Displaced by the Combination
of FIRREA and O'Melveny & Myers.
In Murphy, the Court was faced with an investor who sought damages against
the FDIC on the theory that the failed bank insured by the FDIC was responsible
for the investor's loss in an unsuccessful real estate venture. 195 Murphy had en-
tered into an investment in the Orchid Island Associates Limited Partnership (Or-
chid Island) by paying $515,000.00 for a "partnership unit."196 The partnership
was in the process of developing the Orchid Island Golf and Beach Club in Florida
and Murphy was guaranteed in the investment contract that he would receive a
"6.1 multiple return on investment." 197
The FDIC became involved in this action when its insured bank, Southeast
Bank, N.A., failed in the 1990's.198 Southeast Bank had loaned $50,000,000.00 to
the Orchid Island partnership in the 1980's and 1990's, and had given the partner-
ship a "bridge loan" in order for the partnership to cover operating expenses while
it sought to engage in a public bond offering to finance the completion of the Golf
and Beach Club.199 The latter loan, though, was supposed to create a lien on the
property superior to that of the other lenders.200 As a result, those lenders rejected
the bond proposal, Orchid Island defaulted upon its loans, and Southeast fore-
closed upon the property.201 Southeast then itself became insolvent, and the FDIC
was appointed receiver.202 Murphy sued, seeking to recover for the failure of his
investment.203
191. See id. at 221-23. The Court went on to analyze the effect of FIRREA on state law and
concluded that FIRREA set a "floor-a guarantee that officers and directors must meet at least a
gross negligence standard. It [did] not stand in the way of a stricter standard that the laws of
some States provide." Id. at 674.
192. See id. at 225.
193. 61 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
194. 69 F.3d 1398 (8th Cir. 1995).
195. See Murphy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 61 F.3d at 35.
196. See id.
197. Id at 35.
198. See id
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id
203. See id.
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Foundationally, Murphy's claims against the FDIC were premised upon the
idea that Southeast Bank had control over Orchid Island and in so doing, had at-
tained the status of partner or joint venturer.204 Murphy sought money damages
and an order to require the FDIC to give him certain accounting statements. The
district court, in granting the FDIC's motion for summary judgment on Murphy's
claims, relied upon 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) and D'Oench to justify its decision.
The court denied Murphy's claims, reasoning that the written language in the con-
tracts between Southeast and Orchid Island specifically stated that Southeast would
not be considered a partner or joint venturer.20 5 Moreover, Murphy had failed to
point to a written agreement contradicting this plain language. 206
In reversing the district court's judgment, the D. C. Circuit went through a two
part analysis. It first examined 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) 207 and 1821(d)(9)(A) 20 8
and concluded that,
[b]y their terms, these statutory provisions bar any claim that (1) is based upon an
agreement that is either (a) unwritten or (b) if in writing, does not meet the strin-
gent requirements of §§ 1823(e)(1)(B)-(D), and (2) would diminish or defeat the
interest of the FDIC in an asset acquired by it in its capacity as receiver of a failed
depository institution.2 09
The court then concluded that Murphy's claims were not barred by statute because
they were not related to any specific asset. Murphy's allegations only defeated the
FDIC's interest in the whole value of Southeast Bank. They did not prevent the
FDIC from collecting in full on the particular loan given to Orchid Island and
therefore, the court reasoned, there was no diminution of any specific asset as
required by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(1)(e).2 10
In the second part of its analysis, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the Supreme
Court's reasoning in O'Melveny & Myers "appears to leave no room for a federal
common law D'Oench doctrine.... "211 Although it noted that D'Oench was not
specifically mentioned in the Supreme Court's opinion, the court went on to state
that "the Supreme Court appears to have concluded that the Congress in the FIRREA
did indeed address the question previously governed by D'Oench. It follows that
the need for a body of federal common law under the rubric of D'Oench has now
'disappeared'... "212 The D. C. Circuit therefore concluded that the only way for
204. See id From this premise, Murphy charged in several counts that Southeast, and there-
fore the FDIC, was liable for the wrongdoing of the partnership, including failure to register
securities, unlawful offer and sale of securities, breach of fiduciary duties, breach of contract,
and accounting improprieties. See id. In addition, Murphy contended that Southeast itself had
engaged in wrongdoing in connection with this project, specifically fraud and negligent misrep-
resentation. See id. at 36.
205. See id at 36.
206. See id.
207. See supra note 152 for the text of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1).
208. See supra note 157 for the text of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A).
209. Murphy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 61 F.3d at 36.
210. See iL at 37.
211. Id. at 39.
212. Id. at 40. In holding the common law inapplicable, the court specifically rejected sev-
eral arguments put forward by the FDIC against reading O'Melveny & Myers so broadly. The
court rejected the argument that D'Oench had not even been considered by the Supreme Court
by noting that both sides had raised the question of the possible effects on D'Oench in their
briefs and at oral argument. See id. at 39. It rejected the argument that Langley had already
dealt with the preemption question and had not found displacement by noting that Langley was
a pre-FIRREA decision and that even then the Supreme Court had intimated that D'Oench was
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the FDIC to successfully bar Murphy's claims was through the action of the stat-
ute; because the court had concluded that 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) was no bar, Murphy
could survive the motion for summary judgment. The court remanded the case to
the district court.
Murphy has not been widely used.2 13 It has been mentioned in a number of
opinions, most only noting that the court is not called upon to decide the question
raised by Murphy.2 14 In DiVall Insured Income Fund, L.P u Boatmen's First Na-
tional Bank,2 15 however, the Eighth Circuit invoked Murphy in its decision that
the federal holder in due course doctrine was displaced by FIRREA.2 16 Di Val
concerned an action for declaratory judgment in which DiVall Insured Income
Fund, L.P. (DiVall) sought a ruling that it was not liable upon a promissory note
that Boatmen's First National (Boatmen's) had acquired from the FDIC.2 17 The
note had been issued to DiVall by Metro North State Bank (Metro) and had been
executed by the two general partners of DiVall.2 18 The note was executed in favor
of Metro to provide DiVall with working capital and the bank was authorized in
the loan agreement to make advances on the loan by wire transfer. 2 19 The bank
a "dead letter." Id. It put no stock in the argument that other courts had not held for preemption
by noting that those courts had not dealt with the question. See id. at 39-40. Finally. the court
dealt with the argument that O'Melveny & Myers only concerned the question of the creation of
new common law by arguing that such an argument took too narrow a view of the decision and
ignored "all that the Supreme Court has said before about the impact of comprehensive new
legislation upon existing federal common law." Id. at 40. The court concluded that the force of
Supreme Court precedents in the area of congressional displacement of federal common law
ineluctably led to a determination that FIRREA displaced D'Oench and that 0 Melveny & Myers
supported that determination. See id.
213. Even in the D.C. circuit, the reported cases have shown little impact on the FDIC. Thus
far, no court has used Murphy's holding to enable the maker of a note to assert a defense against
a banking authority that was not covered under § 1823(e). See McGlothlin v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 913 F. Supp. 15, 18 n.5 (D.D.C. 1996) (remarking that D'Oench is no longer applicable,
but that since the RTC asserted an interest in a specific asset, § 1823(e)(1) squarely applied);
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.Atchison & Keller, 913 F. Supp. 19,24 n.2 (D.D.C. 1996) (D'Oench
no longer vital, but "alleged unrecorded side agreements between a co-guarantor and the failed
bank of which the FDIC now is a receiver [would] substantially diminish 0" the FDIC's interest
in a specific asset). Murphy has, however, foreclosed an attempt by a plaintiff attempting to use
the D'Oench estoppel theory against the FDIC. See Suzan Tantleff Trusts v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp., 938 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1996). In Suzan Tantleff Trusts, the court characterized this
argument as stating that D'Oench was "an equitable principle broadly construed by plaintiffs as
a federal policy protecting innocent parties in bank failure situations." It. at 20 n.7. Although
the court remarked it was highly doubtful it would have accepted such a characterization of
D'Oench, it declined to reach the merits because of Murphy. See id. Murphy has also had an
effect in the state courts. See, e.g., Calaska Partners Ltd. v. Corson, 672 A.2d 1099, 1103 (Me.
1996) (agreeing with Murphy and DiVall that FIRREA eliminated the federal holder in due
course doctrine; consequently a purchaser of a note from the FDIC must look to state law to
determine holder in due course status).
214. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Houde, 90 F.3d 600, 605 n.5 (1st Cir. 1996);
DiMuzio v. Resolution Trust Corp., 68 F.3d 777, 780 n.2 (3d Cir. 1995); Hillman v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 66 F3d 141, 142 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995).
215. 69 F3d 1398 (8th Cir. 1995).
216. See iL at 1402.
217. See id at 1399.
218. See id.
219. See id.
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later did make such advances, but they were wired to an account that was in the
name of DiVall Reserves but that was not for the benefit of DiVall.2 20 Though
payments were made on the note, they were not made by DiVall. 22 1
Boatmen's acquired the note in late 1992 as part of a purchase and assumption
executed by the FDIC after Metro was declared insolvent and went into receiver-
ship.2 22 Shortly thereafter, the note went into default and Boatmen's demanded
payment from DiVall. 223 DiVall instituted this action to get a judgment that the
note was unenforceable due to lack of consideration. 2 24 Boatmen's moved for
dismissal, which was treated and granted by the district court as a motion for sum-
mary judgment.225 The district court reasoned that D'Oench and 12 U.S.C. §
1823(e)(1) were inapplicable because DiVall's defense did not rest upon an un-
written agreement.22 6 It further held that under Missouri law, the note at issue
here was not a negotiable instrument. 227 Even so, Boatmen's was held to have the
protection of a holder in due course because of the federal common law holder in
due course rule and the shelter principle.2 28 As a holder in due course, the defense
of lack of consideration could not be asserted by DiVall.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed. The court based its decision upon the
Supreme Court's decision in O'Melveny & Myers and the D.C. Circuit's decision
in Murphy, and ruled that the federal holder in due course doctrine had been pre-
empted by the passage of FIRREA.22 9 The court then disposed of Boatmen's
motion by noting that, first, the bank could not be a holder in due course because
the note had a variable interest rate and under Missouri law was not a negotiable
instrument.2 30 Second, DiVall's defense of a lack of consideration was not fore-
closed by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) because it referred back to a written agreement,
namely the agreement to wire funds as advances on the loan.23 1 The court then
remanded for trial on the merits of DiVall's defense to the note.23 2
B. Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd v. Southeast Bank: the Eleventh Circuit
Distinguishes O'Melveny & Myers.
Not all of the circuit courts have been willing to find displacement by the
passage of FIRREA. The Eleventh Circuit, in particular, refused to follow Murphy
220. See id
221. See id.
222. See id. at 1399-1400.
223. See id. at 1400.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id
228. See id. at 1400. The shelter principle allows a transferee such as Boatmen's to assert all
of the rights against the maker that the transferor could have asserted. Thus, a transferee from a
holder in due course would be able to assert the rights of a holder in due course. See id. at 1400
n.4; U.C.C. § 3-203(b). There is an argument that the DiVall court never needed to reach the
issue of displacement because the federal holder in due course rule was inapplicable. Several
circuits have held that there must first be a negotiable instrument before the FDIC can be a
holder in due course. See supra note 111.
229 See DiVall Insured Income Fund L.P. v. Boatmen's First Nat'l Bank, 69 F.3d at 1402.
230. See id. at 1403.
231. See id. at 1404.
232. See id.
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when it decided Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank.233 Motorcity
arose out of a loan agreement between Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. (Motorcity),
a car dealership, and Southeast Bank (Southeast). Motorcity alleged that when
they approached the bank to obtain financing for the dealership, the investors told
the bank that they had no experience in running a dealership. Southeast allegedly
replied that this did not present a problem and that "the bank 'knew what it was
doing."' 234 Both parties discussed their concern about "out of trust" sales.235 As
part of the agreement, Southeast was given the power to audit Motorcity; monthly
audits were conducted, eventually resulting in the discovery that a pattern of out of
trust sales was occurring at the dealership. 236 Though Southeast sent summaries
of these audits to Motorcity, the bank never informed the dealership of the out of
trust problem.237 When Motorcity hired a new general manager in February of
1989, it learned that the lower level managers were using the sales proceeds to pay
themselves unearned bonuses.238 At that point, Motorcity was $400,000 out of
trust; when Motorcity notified Southeast of this situation, the bank demanded pay-
ment of the full $400,000.239 Motorcity was unable to comply, and Southeast took
possession of the collateral, which included both the dealership itself and $375,000
in certificates of deposit.240
This suit was begun by Motorcity in Florida state court, alleging breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of oral contract, and negligence.241 Before trial, however,
Southeast was declared insolvent by the Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC
stepped in as receiver. Motorcity substituted the FDIC, which then removed the
action to federal court. After Motorcity amended its complaint to state only a
claim for breach of written contract, the district court granted the FDIC's motion
to dismiss.242 The court also refused to grant Motorcity leave to amend its com-
plaint to reincorporate the state tort claims, reasoning that D'Oench and 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e)(1) would prevent the dealership from stating a claim and that "[t]he
genesis of this action is the Southeast floor plan financing agreement, whose writ-
ten provisions do not support a breach of contract claim against the FDIC. No
amount of artful pleading, including further amendments to the complaint, can
alter this result."243 On appeal, a three judge panel of the court of appeals re-
versed, holding that"Motorcity's state law tort claims for negligence and for breach
of fiduciary duty were free standing torts, not barred by the D'Oench doctrine." 244
233. 83 F3d 1317 (lth Cir. 1996) (en banc).
234. Id. at 1322.
235. "Out of trust" means that the money paid to purchase a car was not used to pay off the
loan the bank had made the dealership to purchase the car, such a practice, if "[c]ontinued
unchecked...could pose a threat to a dealership's financial viability." Id
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id
242. See id
243. Motorcity of Jacksonville. Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d 1317, 1323 (1lth Cir. 1996)
(en banc) (quoting from the district court opinion) (internal quotations omitted).
244. Id
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The FDIC's petition for an en banc hearing was granted and on rehearing, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court, ruling in the process that D'Oench and
its line of cases had not been displaced by the passage of FIRREA.24 5
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that 0'Melveny & Myers was not the correct
precedent and that instead, it would rely on United States v. Texas.2 46 According
to the Eleventh Circuit, Texas meant that Congress legislates against a background
of federal common law, and established common law principles would remain
absent an evident purpose to the contrary.247 The court, however, in surveying the
available legislative history, was unable to discover any such purpose.2 48 Instead,
the court felt that
the history of the interaction between the D'Oench common law and the statute
strongly indicates that Congress did not intend preemption. The statute at issue
began in 1950 as a partial codification of the D'Oench case. Subsequently, just
as the D'Oench decision itself was a common law rule fashioned to fill the inter-
stices of federal statutes, courts continued to apply the common law D'Oench
doctrine beyond the confines of the statutory language in order to fulfill Con-
gress' purposes in enacting § 1823(e)(1). Thereafter, in the intervening forty
years, the common law D'Oench doctrine and the cases under the statute evolved
together, each drawing upon the other.249
The court concluded that it was "even clearer in this case than in Texas that Con-
gress did not intend to preempt the prior federal common law D'Oench doctrine."'2 50
The Eleventh Circuit characterized the purpose of FIRREA as "to enhance the
FDIC's ability to address the problems created by the increasing number of finan-
cial institutions in default. ' 2 5 1 Any contrary finding would undermine the pur-
poses of FIRREA by making it more difficult for the FDIC to address the problems
surrounding the default of a financial institution.252
Once the court found that 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) did not displace D'Oench, it
turned to Motorcity's arguments. Motorcity attempted to argue that the oral agree-
ments it relied upon to prove its tort claims against Southeast (and thus the FDIC)
were not barred by 12 U.S.C. §§ 1823(e)(1) and 1821(d)(9)(A) because it had
repaid its loan to the bank. As a result, if it were successful in prosecuting its
claims, there would be no impairment of the FDIC's interest in a specific asset as
required by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1). 253 Because 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) had not
displaced D'Oench, the court found that it did not need to reach the substance of
Motorcity's claims.254 Even if they were outside the statutory scope, D'Oench
was not limited to barring oral agreements relating to specific assets and thus ap-
245. See id. at 1345.
246. 507 U.S. 529 (1993); see also supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
247. See Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir.
1996) (en banc).
248. See id. at 1332.
249. Id. at 1333.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See id at 1333.
253. See id at 1334.
254. The court specifically declined to address the statutory construction argument in Murphy
that the combination of 12 U.S.C. §§ 1823(e)(1) and 1821(d)(9)(A) mandated that agreements
that did not diminish the FDIC's interest in a specific asset were outside the statutory scheme.
See id. at 1334.
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plied to the situation at hand. 25 5 The mere repayment of a loan did not remove
oral agreements from D'Oench's scope. Indeed, to do so would
seriously undermine the policies of the D'Oench doctrine: to protect the bank
examiners who rely on the bank's records in assessing the bank's condition, to
protect the FDIC's ability to insure deposits, and to place the burden on borrow-
ers to make sure that all of the terms of their loan agreements are in writing.X 6
The Eleventh Circuit concluded its analysis by determining that Motorcity's
arguments, even those sounding in tort, were based upon oral agreements. 257 With-
out such agreements, no action could be maintained against the FDIC under state
law.258 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of Motorcity's mo-
tion to file a second amended complaint.2 59
255. See id. at 1334-35.
256. Id. at 1335.
257. See id. at 1338.
258. See Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank. 83 F.3d 1317. 1340 (11th Cir.
1996) (en bane) ("The written financing agreement gave Southeast the right to audit. The mere
conduct of that audit and sending a summary report thereof to Motorcity were entirely consis-
tent with its role as lender. We readily conclude that no fiduciary duty was created under Florida
law."); at 1342-43 (holding that Motorcity's negligence claims were also barred because "the
Florida case law would imply a tort duty only when actions are undertaken for the benefit of
another. It would be inconsistent with well-established Florida law to infer a tort duty merely
on account of actions undertaken pursuant to the protection of one's own interests."); and at
1343-44 (holding that the negligence claim is also barred by Florida's economic loss rule which
requires that "a purchaser of services may not recover purely economic losses in tort unless the
other party's conduct establishes a 'tort "distinguishable from or independent of [the] breach of
contract""') (quotingAFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Telephone &Telegraph Co.. 515 So.2d 180,181
(Fla. 1987).
259. See Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d at 1344. Since the
Eleventh Circuit's en bane decision, Motorcity's petition for certiorari was granted and the Su-
preme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of its
decision in Atherton v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. See Hess v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 519
U.S. 1087 (1997). On remand, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Atherton never addressed
the question of whether longstanding federal common law was displaced by FlRREA. See
Motorcity of Jacksonville v. Southeast Bank, 120 F.3d 1140, 1143-44 (1 th Cir. 1997). Instead,
Atherton dealt with pre-Erie cases that the Supreme Court had ruled had not survived Erie. See
id. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that "the Court obviously never reached or ad-
dressed any issue of statutory abrogation of federal common law." Id. at 1143. D'Oench. on the
other hand, was decided after Erie, leading the court to
decline to accept Motorcity's invitation to overrule D'Oench. With the D'Oench doc-
trine safely in place as a long-standing federal common law rule, we conclude that the
appropriate analysis for the statutory abrogation issue presented in this case is that
articulated in UnitedStates v. Texas and not that articulated inAtherton and O'Melveny.
Id. at 1144. The court then reinstated both the "en banc opinion published at 83 F.3d 1317." and
the 'judgment affirming the district court's judgment granting the FDIC's motion to dismiss."
L at 1145. Motorcity has since filed its petition for certiorari to review the reinstated judgment.
See Hess v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 120 F.3d 1140(1lth Cir. 1997),petitionforcert.filed, 66
U.S.LW. 3435 (December 18, 1997) (No. 97-1025). The Supreme Court denied the petition on
April 27, 1998. See Hess v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 118 S.Ct. 1559 (1998).
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V. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S MOTORCTY DECISION PROVIDES THE CORRECT
RESULT, BOTH SUBSTANTIVELY AND PROCEDURALLY.
The conflict between the circuits created by the Murphy and Motorcity deci-
sions involves more than the question of the FDIC's rights when it acquires an
asset after the failure of one of its insured savings institutions.2 60 These cases deal
with the more fundamental procedural issue of displacement of established federal
common law. As such, any rule adopted to deal with the specific issue in Motorcity
or Murphy will have ramifications beyond the commercial realm. In its inappro-
priate reliance upon O'Melveny & Myers, Murphy stands for the proposition, im-
plicit throughout its analysis, that, when faced with a comprehensive statute, fed-
eral courts must presume displacement of established federal common law. As
previously discussed, this rule upsets established Supreme Court precedent and is
likely to result in the disruption and frustration of congressional policies.
A. The Specific Issue in Murphy is Covered by the Statute.
Perhaps the central irony in the D. C. Circuit's Murphy decision, particularly
when considering its potential far reaching consequences, is that the court did not
need to find that Murphy's claims were outside the statute. When Congress legis-
lates in an area already occupied by the federal common law, a basic assumption
must be that, absent a contrary intention, the statute should be interpreted in such a
way so that it is consistent with established common law rules: "The Court has
admonished that statutes will not be construed in derogation of the common law
unless such an intent is clear.' 26 1 This version of common law involves the inter-
pretation or gloss to be placed upon a statute and as such is qualitatively different
from the "pure" common law rule involved in cases such as D'Oench. "[T]he
authority to construe a statute is fundamentally different from the authority to fashion
a new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to adopt."' 262
No new rule of decision is being created by the courts; rather, they are using the
existing common law as a guide to demonstrate the proper effect of the statute. As
the Court stated in Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson:263
260. The substantive question presented by these cases is a weighty one. Although the bank-
ing crisis of the late eighties and early nineties has largely been resolved, at least in part, by a
robust economy, this resolution should not prevent concern about the possible effects of a recur-
rence. The statutory and common law protection of the FDIC discussed in this Comment di-
rectly affects the cost to that corporation, and by extension to the taxpayer, of any rescue of an
insolvent institution. The more defenses that may be raised against the FDIC when it acts either
in its corporate or receivership capacity to resolve a defunct savings institution, the more expen-
sive the cost of that resolution will be. While savings to the FDIC in individual cases might be
small, in a large crisis, these small savings could become substantial.
261. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 339 n.8 (1981) (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (citing
Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 17, 19 (1966) (holding that § 103 of the Patent Act was a "codification of judicial prece-
dents embracing" the prior federal common law and rejecting, for that reason, an argument
urging the Court to "find in § 103 a relaxed standard, supposedly a congressional reaction to the
'increased standard' applied by this Court in its decisions over the last 20 or 30 years," instead
noting that the statute created "no change in the general strictness with which the overall test is
to be applied").
262. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981).
263. 343 U.S. 779 (1952).
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Statutes which invade the common law.. .are to be read with a presumption fa-
voring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a
statutory purpose to the contrary is evident. No rule of construction precludes
giving a natural meaning to legislation like this that obviously is of a remedial,
beneficial and amendatory character.264
The Supreme Court approved this approach with regard to the D'Oench decision
when it stated in Langley that the statutory language should be construed so as not
"to disserve the principle" of D'Oench.2 65 In its decision to abrogate D'Oench,
the Murphy court relied only upon the fact that FIRRBA was a comprehensive
statute; it did not find that there was congressional intent to read the statute incon-
sistently with the established common law.26 6
The Langley directive is thus still applicable. An application of this principle
in this case, then, leads to the conclusion that the specific facts at issue in both
Motorcity and Murphy, though not in DiVall, do not require the court to reach the
displacement issue at all. The Murphy court began its discussion by examining the
interplay between 12 U.S.C. §§ 1823(e)(1) and 1821(d)(9)(A). 2 67 It concluded
that these two provisions imposed a requirement that all agreements asserted against
the FDIC could only be barred under the statute if it were shown that the agree-
ments, whether written or unwritten, "would diminish or defeat the interest of the
FDIC in an asset acquired by it in its capacity as receiver of a failed depository
institution.' 26 8 The Murphy agreement thus escaped the statute because it was a
general claim against the savings institution and was therefore unrelated to a spe-
cific asset held by the FDIC.2 69 This interpretation of the interplay between the
two statutory sections clearly "disserve[s] the principle" of D'Oench.2 0 The op-
erative fact in the original D'Oench decision as well as in the cases that followed it
was the existence of a secret agreement that had the effect of deceiving the bank-
ing authorities.
The test is whether the note was designed to deceive the creditors or the public
authority or would tend to have that effect. It would be sufficient in this type of
case that the maker lent himself to a scheme or arrangement whereby the banking
authority on which respondent relied in insuring the bank was or was likely to be
misled. 271
The Murphy court implicitly acknowledged it had not read the statute consistently
with D'Oench when it considered the displacement issue; displacement need not
have been determined if D'Oench were inapplicable.
It would not matter that the Murphy court's gloss on the interaction between
these two statutes is inconsistent with D'Oench if its gloss were the only logical
reading. It is possible, however, to read these two sections so that they do in fact
bar the claims asserted by both Murphy and Motorcity. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A)
prevents the assertion of any claim that does not meet the requirements of 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e)(1), 272 while the first part of § 1823(e)(1) reads: "No agreement which
264. Id at 783.
265. Langley v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 484 U.S. 86, 93 (1987).
266. See Murphy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 61 F.3d 34, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
267. See id 36-38.
268. Id at 36.
269. See id. at 37.
270. Langley v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 484 U.S. 86, 93 (1987).
271. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447,460 (1942).
272. See supra note 157 setting out the text of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A).
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tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the Corporation in any asset acquired by
it.. .shall be valid against the Corporation unless such agreement .... -"273 This in-
troduction can be read to impose a fifth requirement upon agreements that may be
asserted against the FDIC. Not only must an agreement be (A) in writing, (B)
executed contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset, (C) approved by the
board of directors or loan committee of the savings institution, and (D) continu-
ously in the official records of the institution, but it must also "diminish or defeat"
a specific asset acquired by the FDIC.2 74 Any agreement that does not relate to a
specific asset, like a breach of fiduciary duty or similar tort claim, could not fall
under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1). Such an agreement would be an "agreement which
does not meet the requirements set forth in section 1823(e) of this title" and there-
fore "shall not form the basis of, or substantially comprise, a claim against the
receiver or the Corporation. '2 75
This reading brings the statute in line with the purpose of D'Oench by making
it more difficult for secret agreements to be successfully asserted against the FDIC.
It is likely that this would also serve the congressional purpose behind F'IRRA.
The Murphy reading creates a loophole that, absent the common law, makes it
easier for the FDIC to be held liable under state law for the malfeasance of insured
savings institutions.2 76 When FIRREA was passed, Congress was concerned with
the potential bankruptcy of one insurance fund, the FSLIC, due to large losses in
the thrift industry;27 7 it would seem to be contrary to that purpose to create a
loophole that makes it easier to assert claims against the FDIC. Courts should read
the statute to bar claims based upon agreements that do not affect the FDIC's inter-
est in a specific asset.
B. FIRREA Does Not Displace Established Federal Common Law.
It is not enough simply to say that the statute reaches the behavior at issue in
both Murphy and Motorcity. If FIRREA and the established common law were
thereby made entirely consistent, then the problem would disappear. FIERBA
does not, however, address the issues covered by the federal holder in due course
doctrine and thus there is no statutory construction argument available to deal with
the issue raised by the Eighth Circuit's opinion in DiVall. If FIRRBA does dis-
place established common law, then the federal holder in due course doctrine is
one of the casualties. Under the latter rule, the FDIC will only rarely be a holder in
due course under state law.27 8 The greater danger, though, is taking Murphy as the
standard to be applied when determining if new statutes displace established com-
273. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) (1994).
274. See id.
275. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A) (1994).
276. The Fourth Circuit has followed Motorcity in declining to follow the Murphy gloss on
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1). See Young v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 103 F.3d 1180,1189 (4th Cir.
1997) (declining to address the question of "whether Congress limited section 1823(e) to claims
that impair the FDIC's interest in a specific asset").
277. See supra Part II.C.
278. Notes acquired through a purchase and assumption are not acquired in a way that would
allow the FDIC to become a holder in due course. See U.C.C. § 3-302 (1990). When the FDIC
acts in its receivership capacity to liquidate the assets of an insolvent bank, it stands in the shoes
of the insolvent bank. See O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79, 86
(1994). See also 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (1994). It can only be a holder in due course if
the insolvent bank held that status. See U.C.C. § 3-203(b) (1990).
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mon law. Murphy does not require congressional intent in order to find a displace-
ment. Rather, the court presumes that comprehensive statutes displace the field
entirely.27 9 The only way for federal common law to survive such a statute under
the Murphy rule is for the statute to specifically indicate an intent to allow such a
survival.
Even if this were the Supreme Court's normal approach to established com-
mon law in the face of comprehensive statutes, the policy balance thus struck must
be questioned. The Murphy court has not followed the correct Supreme Court
precedent. O'Melveny & Myers, the lead case cited by the Murphy court, was
readily distinguishable as precedent. Unlike Murphy, O'Melveny & Myers was
concerned with the creation of new common law after the passage of a comprehen-
sive statute.280 The primary concern with the creation of new common law is that
a "carefully considered legislative program[]" will be upset.2 81 Even though the
federal court acts in an area of significant federal interest, respect for a coordinate
branch of government argues for abstention from the creation of new common
law.2 82
The same can not be said when Congress legislates in a field already occupied
by established federal common law.2 83 In those cases, the Court has required far
279. See Murphy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 61 F.3d 34, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
280. See O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. at 86-87.
281. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981).
282. It should be noted that ajudicial gloss upon a statute can radically change the effect of
the statute. The courts have split over the proper analysis to be undertaken in reading 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e)(1)(B), the requirement that any secret agreement be executed contemporaneously
with the acquisition of the asset in question. While noting that this requirement effectively
prevents the assertion of all defenses arising out of agreements between third parties and obli-
gors, the majority view reads the provision strictly to bar the defense. See DiMuzio v. Resolu-
tion Trust Corp., 68 F.3d 777,782 (3d Cir. 1995) (rejecting contention that 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1)
should not be applied to bar defenses based upon allegedly fraudulent real estate appraisals and
refusing to recognize an equitable exception to the statute where, as here, "an obligor whose
promissory note is purchased on the secondary market can never execute an agreement contem-
poraneously with the bank's acquisition of the note..."); Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., Inc.,
937 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 1991) (rejecting argument that 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) should not apply to
those obligors who had no dealings with the federally insured entity); Victor Hotel Corp. v. FCA
Mortgage Corp., 928 F.2d 1077 (1 th Cir. 1991); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. La Rambla Shop-
ping Ctr., 791 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1986); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Blue Rock Shopping Ctr.,
Inc., 766 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) to accommodation parties to
a note); Chatham Ventures, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 651 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. Unit B
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982); Cardente v. Fleet Bank of Maine, 796 F. Supp. 603 (D.
Me. 1992); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Crow, 763 F. Supp. 887 (NJ). Tex. 1991). Other courts
have argued that a federal court's equitable powers allow it to interpret the contemporaneous
requirement in light of "general business practices" or "commercial reality." See Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Midwest Federal Savings Bank, 36 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 1993); Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Manatt, 922 F.2d 486 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991). While this split
does not say anything directly about the continued vitality of the D'Oench decision, it is impor-
tant to note that it is not just through "pure" common law that changes in the effect of a statute
can be worked.
283. Of course, the field must be truly occupied. In Milwaukee %. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981), the Court struck down a federal common law rule that had been created just prior to the
passage of the federal statute. Though the Court had originally suggested that the creation of a
common law rule was appropriate, it had done so prior to legislation. Moreover, the Court had
only suggested the possibility of a common law rule; unlike the D'Oench decision, this rule had
not been created when Congress legislated. There was, therefore, no way Congress could have
approved or disapproved the proposed rule. As such, the proposed common law rule had the
potential of upsetting the congressional plan and could not be retained. See also supra text
accompanying notes 59-70.
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more than that the statute at issue simply be comprehensive. In United States v.
Texas,284 the Court was unwilling to find displacement absent the expression of a
congressional intent.2 85 As enunciated by the Eleventh Circuit, "federal courts are
not free to contradict a congressional policy choice that 'speaks directly' to a par-
ticular question previously answered by federal common law."2 86 Where there is
no such explicit congressional directive, the courts are faced with a policy choice
between a presumption that the common law is displaced without explicit intent,
the Murphy rule, or a presumption that the common law is not displaced in those
cases. The failure of the Murphy court was its inability to realize that the latter
rule, though it reaches an arguably different result than in O'Melveny & Myers
with respect to the vitality of the common law, equally serves the purpose of pre-
venting the disruption of congressional legislative schemes. Maintaining the pre-
sumption of the survival of the federal common law, even when Congress passes
comprehensive legislation, both protects the continued vitality of the common law
and ensures that where Congress is satisfied with a particular line of decisions, it
does not have to laboriously enact a statutory equivalent to ensure the survival of
the rule. Moreover, the retention of common law rules serves the interest of pre-
dictability. By definition any new statute requires interpretation and interpretation
can lead to uncertainty. If every common law rule must be codified to survive a
comprehensive enactment, then each of these rules will have to be reinterpreted in
light of the new statutory language. A well established common law rule could be
limited or distorted in much the same way that the Murphy court used 12 U.S.C. §
1823(e) to limit D'Oench.
In the specific instance of the relationship between D'Oench and FIRREA,
there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress intended FIRREA to
work a change upon established principles. Congress was primarily concerned
with protecting the savings industry and staving off the threat of disaster that loomed
from the savings and loan crisis.287 Though Congress made changes to 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1823 and 1821 in FLRREA, the specific reasons for those changes were not
discussed. There was no indication of an intent either to displace or to disapprove
of the D'Oench line of cases. 2 88 The statute and the common law had been read in
conjunction to provide a more complete protection for the FDIC; it seems most
likely that Congress intended merely to bolster the statutory side of the equation.
Congress was surely aware that the common law and statute were being read to-
gether; it had ample opportunity to provide some guidance to the federal courts if
it wished the practice to cease with the passage of FIRREA. These speculations
aside, the legislative history is perhaps best characterized as inconclusive with
regard to the codification of D'Oench.
284. 507 U.S. 529 (1993). See supra text and accompanying notes 70-80 for a full discussion
of this case.
285. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. at 535-36.
286. Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d 1317, 1331 (1 lth Cir. 1996)
(en banc) (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618,625 (1978) (holding that even
in the absence of comprehensive legislation, a federal court could not directly contradict an
express statutory provision)).
287. See supra text accompanying notes 131-142.
288. The federal holder in due course doctrine can be included in this description since it
derives from D'Oench. See Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 872 (11 th Cir. 1982).
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Finally, displacement of existing federal common law, particularly in cases
where there is no clear indication of congressional intent to do so, can disrupt the
federal system. Insofar as Congress passed its legislation depending upon the
continued vitality of a uniform federal decision, the displacement of the federal
common law returns such issues to the states. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent to
Milwaukee v. Illinois, pointed out this danger.
By eliminating the federal common law of nuisance in this area, the Court in
effect is encouraging recourse to state law wherever the federal statutory scheme
is perceived to offer inadequate protection against pollution from outside the
State, either in its enforcement standards or in the remedies afforded. This re-
course is now inevitable under a statutory scheme that accords a significant role
to state as well as federal law. But in the present context it is also unfortunate.
since it undermines the Court's prior conclusion that it is federal rather than state
law that should govern the regulation of interstate water pollution.28 9
In the present case, displacement of the federal common law would return the
FDIC's holder in due course status to the states. The FDIC's attempts to enforce
the instruments it obtains would no longer be subject to a uniform law; conse-
quently, its ability to reduce the losses attendant upon the failure of a depositary
institution would be far more uncertain, thus potentially frustrating one of the pur-
poses behind FIRREA. 290
V. CONCLUSION
The interaction between federal statutes and federal common law is an ex-
tremely delicate one. The Supreme Court has managed to create a balance be-
tween the competing interests inherent in our federal system of coordinate branches
of government. In areas of uniquely federal interest, the federal courts may fash-
ion federal rules of decision. This ensures that the supremacy of federal law is
protected, and that federal law remains a uniform body of law.2 9 1 The Court has
recognized, however, that the judiciary is not the final lawgiving power of the
federal government. Congress has the power to determine federal law. Where
Congress acts explicitly to overturn court precedent, there is a displacement of
federal common law. Likewise, when Congress passes a comprehensive statute,
that statute terminates the inchoate power of federal courts to create new law in the
substantive area of the statute. The requirement that such action be explicit allows
Congress to rely upon those common law rules that it believes work correctly
while retaining the power to eliminate a court-made rule it finds inappropriate.
289. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 353 (1981) (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
290. Neither the D'Oench nor the federal holder in due course doctrines greatly alter the
potential outcome under established state law. Although state law would not allow this type of
protection to be extended to the FDIC, all noteholders should realize that their instrument could
be transferred to a holder in due course. In such cases, any defense they might have because of
a secret agreement would be cut off. Thus, the application of federal common law in this in-
stance does not infringe upon or create a result different from the expectations created by settled
state law. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. McCullough, 911 F.2d 593,603-04 (11 th Cir. 1990).
291. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347- 48 (1816) (remarking on
the "importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United
Sates, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution").
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Any other rule would disrupt the balance between statutory and common law and
would create uncertainty within the system by forcing the replacement of estab-
lished and known common law rules with uninterpreted statutory rules every time
Congress enacted comprehensive legislation on a subject.
The Murphy/DiVall rule upsets this balance with its implication that a con-
gressional enactment can abrogate an established common law rule despite the
absence of an explicit intention to do so within either the statute or the legislative
history. The danger in these two decisions is that their implication about the cor-
rect presumption for survival of federal common law might be transferred to other
areas, resulting in disruption and potential frustration of congressional intent.292
Even though the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari and decide this issue,
the other circuits should follow the Eleventh Circuit's Motorcity decision and pre-
vent a further disruption of the balance between federal statutes and federal com-
mon law.
John B. Shumadine
292. For instance, if Congress neglected to mention D'Oench because under United States v.
Texas the common law rule would survive as a supplement to 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1), then the
D.C. and Eighth Circuits have frustrated that intent.
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